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Abstract
In the world the use of auctions has shown two important trends: 1. their use has been extended to
a greater number of countries and sectors, 2. the set of objects auctioned has increased exponentially.
Colombia is not an exception. The number of auctions and items in the country is huge, the sums of
money very large and in some cases the mistakes made are tremendous. Given that, it is strange that
there is no existing article explaining the most important auctions used in the country. The present
paper describes the principal auctions held in Colombia over the past 20 years. Each auction is described
in detail characterizing not only the allocation process, but also some results and conclusions. The work
shows how the use of simple economic theory can allow us to understand the mistakes present in some
auctions (Third Channel Auction) or to learn from auctions that have proven to be successful over time
(electricity sector). This review is su¢ ciently broad, to cover cattle auctions through to nancial ones;
su¢ ciently geographically decentralized, to include agents from both, forested areas and big cities; and
su¢ ciently transversal, to cover the public and the private sectors.
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1 Introduction
Auctions can be used as a selling mechanism when some products or assets do not have a standard price,
or when a seller is uncertain about the value considered the maximum amount that participants are willing
to pay for the objects being sold. When the bidders know the exact value of the object for themselves
(but not the valuation that other bidders have), this is called private valuation. But when there is only an
estimation of these values, and these are a¤ected by information available to other bidders, they are known
as interdependent values.
There are several factors used to evaluate the performance of auctions in di¤erent formats. Auctions are
evaluated in two di¤erent aspects depending on the context. One is from the auctioneers perspective, where
the auction is expected to get the highest revenue possible (auction optimality). This could mean that the
sale price is the highest. The other is the social perspective whereby it is expected that the auction will be
as e¢ cient as possible (i.e. the auction winner is the competitor who values the object the most, therefore,
the result will provide greater benet to society as a whole).
E¢ ciency is usually required by government agencies, sometimes sacricing income; since they prefer
e¢ ciently allocated objects that improve social welfare and benet society as a whole rather than assigning
them to improve individual utility. Meanwhile, auctioneers who are only concerned with earning as much
money as possible seek optimality. This is the case for charity auctions, art auctions, etc. Yet, these two
are not the only targets to be considered as criteria for the design or conduction of an auction, as there are
other activities like: preventing collusion among participants, stopping participants predatory behavior and
avoiding entry deterrence; to mention only a few examples.
Every day, the world is relying more and more on auction design. For example, the USA, Finland or even
the Turkish government (see Chari & Weber (1992), Keloharju, Nyborg & Rydqvist (2005) and Hortacsu &
McAdams (2010)) use auction mechanisms to allocate their securities among a wide variety of countries.
Colombia is not an exception, and auctions have become widely used; however, reviewing Colombian
auctions of over the past 20 years is a very complex task. The complication is down to the fact that there
are some mechanisms in Colombian daily life which resemble auctions; hence a very careful selection has
been made as it would be impossible to include them all. One example is the tenders. They can be seen
as auctions because the process beneath the mechanism works quite similarly. Tenders, are public contests,
were participants use o¤ers to compete against each other, similar to a rst price auction. One important
characteristic is that every participant makes her o his best o¤er and judges choose among the bidders, based
on criteria of what they consider the best o¤er. Of course, many di¤erences between tenders and auctions
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can be pointed out and political issues such as lobbying or corruption could be argued. The important
point is that tenders can be treated as auctions, and in Colombia thousands of them have been held by the
government in their public recruitments. Nevertheless, as impossible as it is to include all the tenders that
have been held, this survey includes a couple of them only to point out their existence and their similarity
to auctions.
This study analyses the most relevant auctions held in the country over the last two decades, with their
respective results and conclusions regarding the criteria previously mentioned. In the following chapters
we study three specic industries of the Colombian economy: electricity and gas; communications; and the
nancial industry. Finally, in the last chapter of this survey, auctions held in other sectors are reviewed.
The scope of this paper takes into account auctions ran by the public and the private sector in each of
these industries. Moreover, the idea of this survey is to encourage some reection about the important aspects
of auction design and the goals of each auction in terms of optimality and e¢ ciency. A brief but complete
description of each auction mentioned in this document can be found in Appendix 1, as well as a summary
table regarding all the topics treated in this article. However, the purpose of this document is not only to
summarize facts, but to expose the successes and errors of Colombian auctions based on what literature has
to say about desirable properties in auctions. In Colombia, some problems concerning auction results may
be due to the fact that in many cases only one bidder participates. This implies that competitiveness can
not be achieved and this leads to loop holes such as market imperfections. Moreover, sometimes it is di¢ cult
to make a clear analysis or evaluation of the optimality and e¢ ciency of these auctions.
Finally, this paper intends for the reader to critically question the key aspects of auction design in the
Colombian context, and, to consider the importance of auctions, as powerful and useful tools in solving
problems due to information asymmetries. With this in mind, and very close attention to key details,
successful auctions, like those of the Colombian treasury bills, will be more common; while embarrasing
mistakes, present in several auctions undertaken by the Colombian government, will hopefully become part
of Colombian auction history.
2 The Electricity and Gas Industry
In this research, the electricity and gas industry is understood as all the institutions which produce, carry,
distribute or commercialize electrical energy, gas or petroleum and its derivatives, among others that have
been involved in an auction as bidders or as auctioneers. Other cases may be seen when assets concerning
electricity, gas or petroleum are being auctioned, or when the production of this energy is auctioned as well.
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2.1 Energy Spot Market Auction
2.1.1 General
Since July 20th 1995 the energy market system administrator and operator XM1 manages the spot market,
created in order to implement a competitive market scheme. In this market there is a Multiunit (Sealed-bid)
Uniform auction running on a daily basis. To participate in these auctions, rms must have the title name
of E.S.P (empresa de servicios publicos), public utility company. This is a day-ahead market, in which the
generating agents make their unique price o¤er or bid, at 8:00 am for the next 24 hours with the expected
hourly generation availability. This price bid is expected to reect the variable costs for the rms plus a
generation risk component.
The same day of the auction the market operator publishes, for all agents, their price bids, discriminated
by generating agent and technological source as well as the hourly energy that each one has to supply at a
determined uniform hourly price (spot price).
The market mechanism allocates the energy among generators in order of merit, from the minimum to
the maximum variable cost, in which the demand doesnt participate at all. The spot price is the bid of
the generating agent which was the marginal rm, the one which fullled the total demand with its o¤er.
The daily load curve can be divided into three di¤erent time intervals: 7:00-9:00, 9:00-19:00 and 19:00-21:00.
The middle one is the base load and the others are the peak load. It is expected that the price rises during
the peak hours because as there is more demand the marginal plants tend to be the plants with higher costs
(i.e. thermal plants) which charge higher prices.
If an agent has a real generation which is bigger than what is established in the ideal dispatch, it generates
more than was planned, a price equal to the minimum is paid between its price bid and an exogenous limit
price. This is called a positive reconciliation and it depends on the generating technological source established
by the market regulator CREG2 . A negative reconciliation can also happen if the agent generates less than
it was planned, and it has to pay the average between the agents bid (price) and the spot price, which is
xed, and doesnt depend on the technological source.
Due to the volatility of the spot market, generators establish bilateral contracts with big consumers or
with intermediaries. Also, through Firm Energy Obligations (FEO), rms that have been adjudicated in an
FEO auction3 receive a xed income. The total income received by the rms can be seen as a portfolio of
1Further information can be obtained http://www.xm.com.co/english/Pages/default.aspx
2The CREG is a gas and energy regulatory commision. Further information can be found at the following website
http://www.creg.gov.co/html/i_portals/index_ingles.php
3See Colombias Firm Energy Obligations (FEO) Auction.
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Bilateral Contracts, FEO, and Spot Market.
2.1.2 Results
The Most important rms (rms with more capacity participation in the market) which participate in this
auction every day are: EMGESA, EPM, CHEC, GECELCA, ISAGEN, EPSA, AES CHIVOR, GENSA,




The daily or monthly price results can be found on XM homepage.
2.1.3 Conclusions
The Spot Market auction is a daily mechanism, in which bidders participate and further their knowledge in
how to "play". Thus bidders are able to collude with others so that their benets, within the price settings,
rise. However, this kind of behavior is hard to prove in a multiunit auction held every day of the year.
In this market there are few agents who have a high percentage of the installed capacity (6 participants
with 81% of total capacity). Therefore, as these participants bid in this auction through their plants,
they somehow contribute to an implicit predatory behavior resulting in entry deterrence of the auction.
New entrants or new electric generation projects of di¤erent agents have few incentives to compete in this
market, because constructing new generating plants requires high capital investment as well as competition
with companies that have huge capacity in a market with oligopolic characteristics.
5
Because of this, the e¢ ciency4 of the auction is questioned; moreover, the e¢ ciency is important because
we are dealing with a public service and the price setting reects on the prices consumers have to pay.5
2.2 Auction of ECOPETROLs renery REFICAR
2.2.1 General
In August 2006, the Colombian Government and the board of ECOPETROL S.A6 , the country´s major
oil company, ran an auction looking for a strategic investment partner to execute the expansion and mod-
ernization project of the renery in Cartagena, northern Colombia, awarding 51% of share participation in
Recar. The winner of this auction had to execute the engineering, procurement and construction. More-
over, in partnership with ECOPETROL, it had to convert the old Mamonal crude processing in to the most
modern in Latin America.
This project was expected to produce 70 thousand to 140 thousand barrels of diesel fuel and gasoline a
day from 2011 on, as well as improve the quality of liquid fuels. One of the main concerns of this project was
to generate at least 5000 jobs in the poor areas that surround Cartagena and contribute to the improvement
of the industrial development in the Caribbean region.
The sale mechanism was that of an ascending auction (English) with successive rounds, in which the
reserve price was not revealed.
At the auction prequalication, four companies were allowed to participate: Petrobras from Brasil,
Glencore International AG from Switzerland, BP Corp. from North America and Marubeni Corp. from
Japan. The two latter companies didnt present any o¤er to participate in the auction, and so, the only
participants were Glencore International AG and Petrobras.
2.2.2 Results
The auction lasted two rounds. In the nal round Petrobras bid $US 595 million, but Glencore International
AG bid $US 630.7 million and won the auction. Despite bidding that amount, it had to pay $US 656 million,
which was the amount valued for 51% of the project. Finally, the reserve price was announced in $US 625
million.
For such an important investment project, the adjudication price was very close to the reserve price.
Thus, the reserve price should have been set higher; because, hypothetically, in this type of auction when
4More information in Espinosa, Miguel A. (2009). In Spanish.
5More information in Espinosa, Miguel A. and Riascos, A. (2010).
6More information in http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/english/
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the reserve price is higher, the revenue rises.
2.2.3 Conclusions
The renery auction held by REFICAR is a distinguished design among all auction formats and it allows for
the adjudication price to increase more and more surpassing the reserve price. On the other hand, having
successive rounds implies that bidders learn how to form cartels in the auctions, this a¤ects the auctioneers
prot. The auction design would lead us to think that the main goal was the auctioneers revenue, but, in
fact, the results show the opposite as the auctioneer didnt earn as much as expected.
In this auction, there were only two potential bidders participating, with only one bid surpassing the
reserve price (the adjudication bid); this shows a problem of optimality in this auction, because none of the
participants had the incentive to pay more than what the auctioneer expected or the reserve price was not
well set. Literature has shown that a high initial price not well established could result in shoddy auctions.
The auction winner didnt have any experience in reneries, it would have been important for the auction
to have any technical or experience requirements for the participants, because default risk could have been
avoided. In fact, this happened with the auction winner, Glencore, which wanted to postpone the work or to
default it, arguing that there were liquidity and credit problems due to the 2008 international crisis. Some
goverment agents considered the rms inexperience as the reason for the default.7
2.3 Ecogas State-Owned Gas Company Auction
2.3.1 General
On December 5th 2006, the national government ran an auction to sell the capital rights and contracts of Em-
presa Colombiana de Gas (Ecogas). Until that date it was the most important Colombian gas transportation
company with a pipeline network stretching around 3,700 kilometers.
The rst stage of the privatization process was held on the 29th of September of 2006. In which by law
the national government had to o¤er State-owned properties to the pensions and employees funds, unions,
cooperatives and other social organizations.
For this stage, the only qualied institution was a pension fund, which o¤ered COP $1.96 Billion, which
was below the 10% expected by the government. The bid was rejected.
The next step for selling Ecogas was an auction. This was a rst price sealed bid auction with successive
rounds, with a reserve price not revealed until the end of the auction. The auction ended when the highest
7More information can be found on http://www.portafolio.com.co/archivo/documento/CMS-4767265 (In Spanish)
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bid exceeded the second highest bid by 5% and surpassed the reserve price.
The prequalied companies for the auction were: Empresa de Energía de Bogotá (EEB), Prisma Energy
International-Promigas, Promotora de Desarrollo de América Latina S.A. de C.V. fromMexico, Interconexión
Eléctrica S.A. (ISA), Embridge from Canada, and Corporación Financiera Internacional from World Bank.
Only the rst two companies actually took part in the auction: Empresa de Energía de Bogotá (EEB)
and Prisma Energy International-Promigas, because the other companies did not present the technical o¤ers
required to participate.
2.3.2 Results
The auction only had one round, with Prisma Energy International-Promigas o¤ering around COP $2.885
billion, and with EEB o¤ering COP $3.25 billion. There was a secret reserve price revealed later of COP
$2.2 billion. Ending the auction with EEB as the winner surpassing the second bid by around 12.65%, as
well as exceeding the reserve price, as stated in the rules of the auction.
2.3.3 Conclusions
The auction resulted in a competitive adjudication price, approximately 47% higher than the reserve price,
with a high revenue for the auctioneer. Although there were only 2 participants, some other important
companies passed the prequalication period with the intention of participating in the auction, so there were
plenty of opportunities for new entrants.
In this auctions held by the national government, e¢ ciency was an essential concern. The results dont
necessarily illustrate that the winner of the auction valued the object the most (holding rights of such an
important gas transportation company). The fact that the gap between the adjudication bid and the second
highest was 12%, could show evidence of the winners curse.
2.4 Auction of Three Power Companies
2.4.1 General
On February 26th 2008, the national government ran a sealed-bid rst price auction for shares of three
electric power companies, these were the Cundinamarca (EEC ), Santander (ESSA) and Norte de Santander
(CENS ) power companies. The main purpose of the auction was to raise money for the national government
budget (optimality). The auction was rst planned to sell ve power companies with expected revenues of
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at least COP $1 billion, but the Boyacá (EBSA) and Meta (EMSA) power companies were not taken into
consideration in the nal auction. After the auction, the three companies remained public because they
were bought by a suitable public operator (previously selected between the two showed below) in partnership
with respective departmental governments. The auction was simple, the partnerships, independently of each
department, presented sealed-bids that had to surpass the reserve price previously established by the national
government and not published for the total shares owned by the national government (not necessarily 100% ).
The operators selected by the departmental governments were: EPM (Empresas Publicas de Medellín)
by Santander and Norte de Santander departments, and EEB (Empresa de Energía de Bogotá) for Cundi-
namarca departments. The operators had to acquire a minimum of 50% plus one share.
The government actually auctioned the following: 79% shares of Norte de Santander Power Company
(CENS ), 82% shares of Santander Power Company (ESSA) and 88% shares of Cundinamarca Power Com-
pany (EEC ).
2.4.2 Results
EPM acquired around 77% of Norte de Santanders Power Company (CENS ) shares for COP $180,000
million, which had a reserve price of COP $165,130 million. The departmental government of Norte Santander
kept 8% of the shares they owned, and 12.5% went to Co¤ee Committee.
EPM acquired 74% of Santanders Power Company (ESSA) shares for COP $373,000 million, which had
a reserve price of COP $365,769 million; the departmental government of Santander kept 22% of the shares
and the municipality of Bucaramanga kept 2.76% of their shares.
EBB in partnership with the departmental government acquired 88.1% of Cundinamarcas Power Com-
pany (CENS ) shares for COP $211,681 million, which had a reserve price of COP $120,220 million.
The total revenue for the national government from selling the three Power Companies was around COP
$764,000 million.
The results shown above, are summarized in the following table:
Table 1: Auction Results for the Three Power Companies
Power Company Shares Sold Reserve price (COP $Million) Winner Acquisition Price (COP $Million)
CENS 77% 165,130 EPM 180,000
ESSA 74% 365,769 EPM 373,000
CENSA 88.10% 120,220 EEB 211,681
Revenue COP $764,681 Million
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Source and calculations: Business News Americas.
The results show that the CENS auction was won by EEB with a bid that exceeded the reserve price by
almost COP $90,000 million. The national government raised more than was expected with this auction,
but Cundinamarcas departmental government and EBB may have saved a lot of money.
2.4.3 Conclusions
The Auction sale of the three Power Companies had only one potential bidder per company which became
the winner of each one; this shows that there were no incentives for new entrants to participate. This was a
problem, due to the lack of competition, in terms of the main objective which was to raise the governments
revenue. So perhaps if the auctioneer designed a more competitive auction the revenue would have been
even bigger.
Although the aim was for the power companies, to remain public, these auctions could have had more
than one participant per auction, so a more competitive auction would have been held with bigger revenue
for the national government.
The lack of competitiveness may have been a problem of entry deterrence and implicit predatory behavior
since the departmental governments picked these huge public companies, restricting other participants from
taking part in the auction against these potential bidders. Another reason may also have been the restrictions
within the auction design.
The results show that in the CENS Auction, despite the fact that the national government raised a lot of
money, EEB and the department of Cundinamarca overestimated the value of the company and they ended
up paying more for it than what it was worth. This is known, in auction literature, as the winners curse.
Well known in theoretical eld, is the fact that rst price sealed bid auctions are not e¢ cient and also
that the reserve price could raise higher revenues, but the most important idea is that in an auction there
has to be competition in order to develop strategic behaviors. Total lack of competition, as in this case, can
generate the worst results in terms of revenue because each bidderattached to each power company has a
bargaining power in the sense that nobody else is competing for that market and also political pressure on
the government make a suitable environment for low revenues.
The problem here is not about the auction design they chose, the actual problem is that the dynamic
of the auctiondoesnt show auction characteristics at all. However, this entry problem could be an issue
related to political statements, such as the idea that territorial entities were the appropriate candidates
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to participate. On closer analysis, entities nearer the power companies would have lower transaction and
administrative costs, and also they are more likely to choose suitable operators in the area that by nature
have lower costs in the market. For example, EEB, one of the suitable operators, was an operator in the
Cundinamarca area, where ECC the power company was located. This implies a direct relationship with
local governmental entities. Therefore, these entities are more suitable candidates to be the elected as auction
participants, leading to a decrease in other potential candidates.
The main idea lies in the political context in which this auctionwas run.
2.5 Colombias Firm Energy Obligations (FEO) Auction
2.5.1 General
Taking into account that a large proportion of the electricity in Colombia is produces by hydro generation
(approximately 67% ), hydrological phenomena and constant climate change may give rise to shortages causing
great volatility in prices spot market (power exchange), leading to a greater risk for both existing and new
generators seeking to invest in such projects.
The mechanism implemented by Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG) and administrated by
XM Compañía de Expertos en Mercados S.A ESP was an auction of Firm Energy Obligations (FEO) needed
to cover the energy demand. This mechanism was needed to ensure the systems reliability by providing
incentives for investments in new resources to assure enough rm energy the ability to provide energy during
dry periodto fulll the future demand in times of scarcity at e¢ cient prices reducing investors risk as well
as cost to consumers. Under this scheme, the generators which were assigned with FEO have a xed energy
payment when the spot market price surpassed, for at least one hour a day, the scarcity price.
The auction was held on May 6th 2008 with FEO starting from December 1st 2012 until November
30th 2013. First there was a prequalication period, where existing generators and new investors sent
information required to participate in the FEO allocation. This auction has a uniform price formation
and is held whenever needed depending on energy demand forecasts and is held 4 years in advance of the
commitment period.
XM runs a descending clock auction8 ; like a descending multiunit uniform auction with multiple rounds,
in which the price was the highest winning bid. This auction was opened with a starting (reserve) price of
2 times CONE (Cost of new entry), initially set administratively by the CREG. The rst round was sealed
at a closing price set by the auctioneer. New plants submitted their bids during the auction while existing
8More information in Cramton, P. and Stoft, S. (2007) and Harbord, D. and Pagnozzi, M. (2008).
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plants submitted their bid previous to the auction, with the possibility of temporary withdraws at certain
prices, like a sealed-bid auction for the existing plants. Between the starting and closing price of the round,
the bidders (new plants) presented quantities to supply at certain prices consistent with an upward sloping
supply. These bids were not published; it was a sealed-bid format. Then the administrator constructed an
added supply and announced an excess of supply. With this, it calculated a new closing price for the second
round. Then the bidders again answered this with an upward sloping supply. The process continued until
the supply and demand were balanced.
2.5.2 Results
There were 78 projects presented at rst of which only 10 projects were actual participants of the auction,
they were property of 8 bidders with new plants. There was a total of 18 participant bidders, including
bidders with new and existing plants. The starting price (2*CONE ) was 26.09 US$/MWh and the closing
price for the rst round was 22 US$/MWh. The auction lasted 6 rounds, with a closing price of 13.998
US$/MWh.
The Scheme of the rounds is shown below:
Table 2: FEO Auction Rounds
Round Starting P. (US$/MWh) Closing P.(US$/MWh) Supply E. (GWh/year)
1 26.09 22 8355
2 22 20 7851
3 20 18 4537
4 18 16 3467
5 16 14 907
6 14 12 -1765
Auction Closing Price 13.998 US$/MWh
Source: XM.
This table shows each round of the auction, with its respective starting and closing price, and the supply
excess announced by the auctioneer at the end of each round.
Firm Energy was allocated to 47 existing plants and to 3 new plants, belonging to di¤erent bidders,
of which one is owned by a new market participant (GRUPO POLIOBRAS S.A). These new plants and
allocations were assigned as follows:
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Table 3: FEO Auction Winners
Firm Plant FEO (GWh/year) Technology Installed Capacity (MW)
Isagen S.A E.S.P Amoya 214 Hydroelectric 78
Grupo Poliobras S.A Termocol 1,678 Natural gas/ Diesel (Fuel oil) 201
Gecelca S.A E.S.P Gecelca 3 1,117 Coal 150
Source: XM.
This table shows the winners of the auctions, specifying the rm that owns each plant, or electric
generation unit, with the rm energy allocated the technology and the production capacity installed.
The total assignment including existing generating plants was 65,869 GWh/year, of which only 3009
GWh/year (4.56%) were allocated to new plants.
The auction closing price (13.998 US$/MWh) was higher than the CONE (13.045 US$/MWh), which
was the target or optimum price expected.
Of the 10 new plants belonging to the 8 bidders, only 1 was a Hydro technology plant, while the others
were Coal, CC-GAS, Fuel Oil and Gas technology plants.
2.5.3 Conclusions
This FEO auction mechanism has a robust design with rules that mitigate the exercise of market power
and allow new entrants with di¤erent technological sources to take part. However, it provides incentives for
collusion, since a generator (bidder) can have several plants and bid for each one independently bidding in
a way that it takes the biggest revenue possible. Also, if this generator faces becoming the marginal plant
with di¤erent capacity plants participating, it can withdraw plants in a way that it xes a convenient price
with the highest capacity being allocated.
Despite the aim of improving the systems reliability, a Hydro technology plant was adjudicated. The
goal of ensuring the reliability was not completely achieved because more Hydro capacity was added to the
market, somehow a¤ecting the e¢ ciency of the auction, due to the fact that the plants with less nature-social
costs are thermal plants. Anyhow, the resulting price was higher than the expected e¢ cient price, showing
that new entrants tend to bid more than their valuation9 , or that CONE was somehow just an expected
price.
The information revealed by the auctioneer did not necessarily inuence the bidding behavior of the new
plants, as it is supposed to work theoretically with multiple round auctions. This can be explained because
9More information in Forero,G. and Espinosa, M. (2011).
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variations in the excess of supply were not clear in terms of what kind of bidder retired from the auction, a
new or an existing plant, this distinction could have been relevant for bidders.
In energy markets, where auctions are held daily, the uniform auction design is particularly vulnerable
to collusion (tacit or explicit one), because every bidder must submit a curve according to their position in
the market (either demand or supply). For example, in the case that bidders have to bid a demand curve
for every price level, one form of collusion is when each bidder bids higher prices for small quantities (see
Klemperer, 2003 ) and a deviation from this collusion results in a higher cost for everybody. In the same
way, when every bidder is bidding a supply curve, they could bid lower prices for small quantities hoping
that the added supply curve has a high upwarding slope. Therefore, this mechanism (especially in an energy
market) needs a high entry to avoid any type of agreement.
In the end, revenue wasnt a problem; this mechanism actually worked, some improvements could be
made, or a more e¢ cient mechanism can be implemented (i.e. Vickrey design). Some important data is
that only 3 new plants were adjudicted with FEO (out of 10), against 47 existing plants; of these new plants
adjudicated, one was Hydro technology, another Gas/Fuel Oil and the last was Coal as shown in Table 3.
2.6 Auction for the Available Production of Firm Gas
2.6.1 General
On December 17th of 2009, ECOPETROL S.A ran an auction for the available production of rm gas to
o¤er in Casanare (A state in the Colombian east) elds of plant LTO-II in Cusianas Oil well. The product
o¤ered was a uniform o¤er of rm gas of 32.821 MBTUD (PDOF ) from the 1st of August of 2010 until the
5th of June of 2015 to supply plant LTO-II in Cusiana.
An auction took place due to the regulations that state that if the purchase request exceeds the PDOF,
the sale has to be undertaken by auction. Which was exactly what happened between 2010 and 2015.
The participants who took part in this auction satised certain legal requirements declared previously by
the auctioneer and they had to pay a guarantee of seriousness of US $1.219.920, corresponding to the 10%
of the minimum quantity available for buying.
The mechanism used, was that of an ascending multiunit open electronic auction (English Auction)10
with successive rounds, in which the price was uniform for all the winners. The whole auction process and
some of the rules are described below.
10Further information can be consulted in REGLAMENTO DE LA SUBASTA CON LAS MODIFICACIONES DEL
ADENDO No. 1, 2, 3 y 4. Diciembre 2009 Bogotá, Colombia. (www.ecopetrol.com.co) (In Spanish)
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There was a starting price for the rst round of 3.40 US$/MBTU. The auction ruled that the minimum
purchase o¤er was to be 2,000 MBTU and the maximum, 32,821 MBTUD (PDOF ). The auction was
electronic so the bidders submitted their bids via internet with an electronic tool supplied by ECOPETROL
S.A.
According to the rules, the maximum variation of the price between rounds is the 5% and the minimum
variation would be the previous rounds elasticity. At the beginning of each round the auctioneer published
the starting price, the smallest and largest o¤er as well as the demand excess from the previous round.
During the auction the participant could only bid one o¤er per round, and as the price increased the bidder
could only maintain or reduce the ammount o¤ered. If the bidder did not send an o¤er in a determined
round the rules stated that this would be considered a retirement o¤er. If any of the rules were unfullled
by the bidders, they were disqualied from the auction.
When the sum of valid o¤ers made by the bidders was less or equal than PDOF then that was named the
last or adjudication round and the residual supply was calculated. This nal round had 2 stages. Stage 1:
The auctioneer assigned the quantity of valid o¤ers made in the previous round. Stage 2: The participants
made a price bid for the total excess of supply, in which the price bid had to be at least the same as the
closing price from the previous round. After a bid was sent, the participant could see all the price bids
made by the contenders in a descending ranking and it could send more price bids until the remaining time
expired, with the condition that it had to raise its own bid by 0.01 $US/MBTU. The winner of the excess of
supply was the one with the highest price bid. If there happened to be a tie in the highest bid price, then,
the one who rst made the bid had won.
The price of adjudication was uniform. It depended of the initial price of Stage 1 of the nal round, the
highest price bid for the excess of supply (Stage 2 ). The quantity allocated in Stage 1 and the quantity
allocated in Stage 2 (excess of supply).
Eighteen companies qualied to participate in the auction. Some of these were: EMPRESAS PÚBLICAS
DE MEDELLIN E.S.P. (EPM ), ISAGEN S.A. E.S.P., GAS NATURAL S.A. E.S.P. and PETROBRAS
COLOMBIA LIMITED.
2.6.2 Results
The results of the auction were: A price of 6.14 US$/MBTU, for August 2010 and modied by an index.
The quantities allocated with the respective company were:
Table 4: Auction for the Available Production of Firm Gas
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Company Quantity (GBTUD)
Isagen S.A E.S.P 19
Mansarovar Energy Colombia LTDA 6.8
Gas Natural S.A E.S.P 4
Petrobas Colombia Limited 3
Total 32.8
Source: Aguilar, P., Roda, P. & Sánchez, G. (2010). Consideraciones
regulatorias, precios de bolsa y subasta de gas. Informe 46-2010.
Superintendencia de Servicio Publicos.
The results of this auction showed that the adjudication price was high compared to the gas regulation
price. However, the quantity auctioned (32.821 GBTUD) is very low compared to the quantities demanded
on the market, reaching more than 350 GBTUD; with only 9.37% of the market needs auctioned.
2.6.3 Conclusions
This auction held by ECOPETROL S.A had a format in which it is common for the bidders to collude
because of bid signaling due to the open format, or to employ predatory behavior because strong bidders
can make public their will to overbid every atempt made by other bidders to win the object and not allowing
new entrants to participate. However, the fact that this was an electronic auction, gave this format sealed
bid characteristics, allowing more partcipants to take part in the auction, having no entry deterrence at all
(Klemperer, 2003).
The results highlight the e¢ ciency of the auction, given that the resulting price11 resulting from it was
high compared to the normal regulation price. This was important because, on the whole, participants
revealed their costs and their true willingness to pay for providing the rm gas. However, if another kind of
auction is held, participants would learn from experience, and possibly collude or tend towards lowering the
price. This is why the format should be changed to a uniform sealed bid electronic auction with successive
rounds, so that there would be no accesible information as in the open format; which allows the bidders to
collude.
11More information in CONSIDERACIONES REGULATORIAS, PRECIOS DE BOLSA Y SUBASTA DE GAS. Informe No
46 -2010. Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos. (In Spanish)
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3 The Communications Industry
In this document, when we refer to the communication industry we mean all the institutions that participate
in di¤erent media services, such as radio, television, telephones or cell-phones and that have been involved
in an auction as bidders or as auctioneers. Other cases may include the auction of companies that have
licenses for radio electric spectrum, radio frequencies or TV frequencies or when these kinds of licenses are
auctioned as well.
3.1 Personal Communication Services (PCS) Auction
3.1.1 General
Between late 2002 and early 2003, the Colombian Ministry of Communications (Ministerio de Comuni-
caciones)12 held an auction (multiunit but could also be sold as one package) to adjudicate licenses for
providing Personal Communication Services (PCS)13 . These services allow voice, data and mobile or xed
image transmission with a license of 30 MHz provided within the frequency bands 1.895MHz-1.910MHz and
1.975MHz-1.990MHz of the radio electric spectrum, in each of the three di¤erent regions in which the country
was divided (Eastern, Western and North). There was the possibility of adjudicating more than one region
for a single bidder (i.e. the bid could be for each region or for a package of regions).
With the introduction of new mobile services operators in Colombia, it was expected that the market
conditions would be modied, eliminating the duopoly of Comcel and Celumovil, which had really high
rates, thus generating competition which benets the consumers with favorable rates, high quality service
and improving the coverage area. The winner of the auction (new operator) was expected to have conditions
to compete against the existing operators.
There were some important aspects or purposes stated: i) transfer the majority of oligopolistic rent
calculated by the stakeholders to the state, ii) create competition among the stakeholders, iii) transfer the
last portions of oligopolistic rent derived from the synergies of the operators to the state, iv) implant a simple
mechanism that achieves these objectives, v) provide an objective and transparent mechanism in light of
potential stakeholders, so as to provide an atmosphere of condence about how they will adjudicate the
concession.
A three stage auction was designed to achieve these purposes. The rst stage was an accreditation stage,
in which the potential applicants submitted a sealed envelope containing documents proving their suitability
12More information at http://archivo.mintic.gov.co/mincom/faces/index.jsp?id=3392
13More information in Documento CONPES 3118, 3202. Departamento Nacional de Planeación. (In Spanish)
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to participate in the process and hence to be adjudicated with the PCS system. Some of the requirements
included conditions regarding legal, technical, nancial and experience aspects.
The second stage involved a sealed bid, similar to a discriminatory multiunit auction to make a selection
of the best bids but no adjudication, in which there is a second envelope with an initial bid; it could be an
individual bid per region or a joint bid for the three regions. This stage was only open to those who passed
the rst. This initial bid had to be at least 80% of a minimum value stated by the government. The bidders
would then be allowed to raise their bid to the minimum value, only once, and thus be able to participate
in the next stage. If only one bidder was taking part, the auction would be declared unsuccessful and be
terminated with no adjudication; unless the bidders initial bid was at least 90% of the minimum value.
The third stage was a simultaneous ascending auction with successive rounds (Multiunit English auction).
Each of the bidders could improve their bids competing with the other participants. At the end of each round
there would be a temporal winner with the highest bid per round. Between rounds each bidder had to improve
their bid by at least 0.5%. The nal winner of the auction was whoever had made the highest bid at the
end of the nal round.
3.1.2 Results
Only one company, Colombia Movil (OLA) participated in the auction, and was adjudicated with the license
for the three regions. This entity was formed through a consortium made up by two of the countrys largest
telephone companies: ETB and EPM. The adjudication price was US $56 million.
3.1.3 Conclusions
It is not possible to conrm that all the objectives stated at the beginning of the auction were accomplished,
basically because there was only one participant in the auction.
This may have not be a problem of auction design, but rather, due to the bad economic conditions of
the telecommunications sector and of the country at the time the auction was held. The auction result was
poor and had an entry deterrence problem, with a low adjudication price and lack of competition against
the auction winner.
In a PCS auction, it is normal for e¢ ciency to become a relevant matter, especially in Colombias Mobile
Telecommunications sector at a time where the only two companies were charging high prices. Thus, it was
important for the rm that valued the most and won the auction, to render this a more competitive market
with lower prices for consumers. However, the lack of entry makes it di¢ cult to evaluate the e¢ ciency of the
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auction, because any other participant may have valued the object more than the sole participant (winner).
3.2 TELECOM-COLTEL Auction
3.2.1 General
On April 7th 2006, the national government ran an auction for 50% plus one share of the public Telecommu-
nications Company Colombia Telecomunicaciones S.A ESP (Coltel/Telecom)14 turning this company into a
public services rm of private nature, with the purpose of having an oligopoly of the public government with
an international investor, instead of a public monopoly. The mechanism used for the sale of Coltel/Telecom
was a multiple round English auction. The company valuation was held by the investment bank CITI-
GROUP Global Markets Inc, at COP $533,577 million (US $233 Million), established as the reserve price
for the auction.
At rst, ve companies showed an interest in participating in the auction, these were: Telefónica (Spain),
CANTV (Venezuela), Phone 1 (Sweden), TELMEX (Mexico) and from Colombia: Empresa de Telecomuni-
caciones de Bogotá (ETB), Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM ) and Cablecentro in partnership with a
European company.
But due to the terms of reference, unfavorable for private or public national companies, ETB, EPM and
Cablecentro were implicitly retired from the auction.
There were only two participants who accomplished the technical and economic requirements and that
didn´t receive any objection by the regulator (Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio). These two
participants were Telefónica from Spain and CANTV from Venezuela.
3.2.2 Results
This auction lasted 5 rounds. Telefónica of Spain won with a nal bid of COP $853,577 million (US $369
million) surpassing CANTVs nal bid of COP $813,577 million (US $351 million). Although there were
only two participants, this was a competitive auction because there were more bidders who wanted to
participate but could not due to technical requirements. The mechanism of multiple rounds helped to raise
the competitiveness and the nal price. With only one round, the adjudication price could have been lower.
This auction ended with an adjudication price exceeding the reserve price by approximately, COP
$320,000 million (60%), which reected that it fullled the expectation of the auctioneer.
14More information in Matias, Sergio R. (2006) and Matias, Sergio R. (2007). (In Spanish)
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3.2.3 Conclusions
In the auction theoretical eld, the mechanism used to sell Telecom is well known as one that tends to raise
prices due to multiple rounds (Klemperer, 2001). In spite of there being only two participants, it seemed
like a competitive auction in which there were multiple potential bidders tending to participate. However,
as the main potential bidders were two of the most important telecommunication companies, this gave way
to certain predatory behavior, because of their reputation. In addition, the auction format was very robust
and there was not any observable failure in it to arm that bidders had incentives to collude.
E¢ ciency was an important concern in the goals of the auction because what the winner of the auction had
to value most was providing public services, such as telecommunications, in partnership with the national
government forming some kind of duopoly in the market. The result showed this, not only because the
adjudication price exceeded the reserve price by far, but also because two well known potential bidders
lasted ve rounds until only one remained showing that they really wanted the prize.
3.3 Colombia Movil S.A (OLA) Auction
3.3.1 General
On August 31st 2006, the boards of Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Bogotá (ETB)15 , Empresas Públicas
de Medellín (EPM ), UNE Telecomunicaciones and Colombia Movil S.A ran an auction for 50% plus one
share of the Mobile Telecommunications Company Colombia Movil S.A (OLA) looking for a strategic partner
to operate and embrace more market share of the mobile telecommunication in Colombia as well as dening
the commercial and technological strategies.
The valuation of the company was made by an important investment bank Corcolombiana S.A, and this
value was only released the day of the auction as a reserve price, the value estimated was COP $1,146,000
million.
The sale mechanism proposed was a rst price multiround auction. The day of the auction the Bogota
Chamber of Commerce16 announced that the validation of an o¤er was subject to the bid, which had to be
at least 85% of the reserve price.
In this process, 13 Mobile Telecommunications companies with experience in emerging markets were
invited to participate.
15Further information about the company can be nd at www.etb.com.co. (In Spanish)
16 It is a private organization concerning the formality of economic activity and business development. More information at
http://ingles.ccb.org.co/portal/default.aspx
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At rst six mobile operators were interested in the process: Digicel Ltd (Digicel), Entel PCS Telecomuni-
caciones S.A. (ENTEL), Millicom International Cellular (MIC ), América Móvil (Comcel), Cable & Wireless
and Telefónica Móviles.
The rst phase of the process ended on May 5th with the selection of three potential investors: Digicel
Ltd (Digicel), Entel PCS Telecomunicaciones S.A. (ENTEL) and Millicom International Cellular (MIC ).
But ENTEL did not nally participate.
At 3:00 pm the term expired for Digicel and MIC to introduce their sealed-bid into the urn, but 5 seconds
before the MIC introduced its bid. Digicel did not even try to introduce its bid because the company did
not pay the $30,000 million pesos policy committed to make a bid in this auction. The reserve price was
released immediately.
3.3.2 Results
The MIC folder, the sole participant, contained a bid of COP $1,135,000 million, COP $11,000 million less
than the reserve price. It was announced that the o¤er had to be raised. Later, MIC o¤ered COP $1,147,000
million, only COP $1000 more than the reserve price. Closing the deal and winning the auction.
This auction involved no competitiveness, since there was only one participant that paid only a little
more than the reserve price.
Although the auctioneer raised COP $30,000 million from the entry policy, the idea was for there to be
more than one participant, so they could achieve a high adjudication price which exceeded the reserve price
by much more than it did, and even more than the entry policies.
3.3.3 Conclusions
Although this mechanism, in which Colombia Movil S.A was adjudicated, is one that tends to raise the prices
due to the multiple rounds, it did not even accomplish competitiveness. Despite this, there were plenty of
bidders interested in participating in the auction, the selection of potential bidders may have contributed to
entry deterrence.
The presence of only one bidder in the auction may be considered a lack of interest and incentives of
new entrants leading to an ine¢ cient allocation of the company. The auction design, and specically the
entrance requirements, may have contributed to the bad outcome. This ine¢ ciency is a major issue in this
type of auction of a telecommunication company as a participant in the countrys Mobile Telecommunications
oligopoly. Moreover, the fact that the adjudication price was almost the same as the reserve price shows
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how ine¢ cient and non optimal this auction was, due to the poor revenue raised.
3.4 Third Private TV Channel Auction
3.4.1 General
In 1997, the rst two private TV channels were adjudicated and in 1998 they started broadcasting. Some
studies show that both national private channels have 67% of the total ratings in the country and 90% of
the advertisement investment in Colombian TV17 . Colombia is one of the few countries where open TV is
losing audiences to pay-per-view television (PPV TV). It may be the case that peoples TV demand is not
satised. This is why the CNTV18 (Comisión Nacional de Television/ National Commission Television)
held an auction on July 27th 2010, in order to adjudicate a new private TV channel in Colombia. Some
other reasons were to increase the competition, maximize revenue and improve the quality of the service. A
lot of interest was shown among national and international investors, which is why the CNTV considered
adjudicating two licenses. Finally, however, only one was adjudicated. Neither the two existing private
channels agreed with the CNTV decision because that implied a more competitve market, with less revenue
for them.
The auction had a reserve price of COP $103,409 million, which was known by the bidders. The auction
format was similar to a sealed-bid rst price auction with successive rounds. In which only the participants
that were enabled in a previous requirement procedure were able to participate. The rst envelope delivered
determined which bidders continued to participate, and the lowest bids were excluded from the next round,
leaving only the two highest participant bids. In the next round the bids made had to be greater than the
highest of the rst round, and if one bid exceeds the other by 30% then the license was adjudicated. If not,
there would be another round in which the auctioneer would decide the winner depending on the third bid
made by the participants. The winning bid was added to the reserve price, and that was the nal price paid
by the winner. If there were only one participant, the reserve price and then the adjudication price, would
be 10% higher.
3.4.2 Results
Some of the companies interested in participating in the auction were: Canal 3 (Grupo Planeta), Inversiones
Rendiles (Grupo Cisneros) and Grupo Prisa among others.
17More information on LICITACIÓN PÚBLICA No.002 de 2.010. (In Spanish).
18More information in spanish available at http://www.cntv.org.co/cntv_bop/
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At the end of the requirement process the only participant left was Grupo Planeta and it was not
adjudicated with the license for the third Colombian private TV channel. This happened because some
requirements (such as the fact that legally at least 2 bidders were required to participate)19 with Procu-
raduria General the Colombiawerent accomplished. If it had been adjudicated, the adjudication price
would have been, the reserve price (COP $103,409 million) plus 10% (COP $10,340.9 million).
3.4.3 Conclusions
The aims couldnt be clearly evaluated in this auction because it was not held. This may have been a
problem of auction design. This failure was also due to a possible collusion in which the other two participants
withdrew their propositions before making any economic bid, or it may have been down to possible predatory
behavior because of Grupo Planetas reputation in owning the major newspaper in Colombia El Tiempo20
and other companies.
There were major political and legal concerns about the adjudication of this license which may have
a¤ected the interests of everyone involved, this is why this auction design and this adjudication is considered
a big failure.
Another big failure in this auction, was that a long time passed between its announcement and its
realization. Thus the bidders could have prepared themselves for the auction and could had coordinated
their bids to collude. Also, the auctioneer revealed more information than necessary; for example, in making
the reserve price public. Therefore, the problem lied in auction design.
4 The Financial Industry
In this study, the nancial sector is understood as all the nancial institutions, such as banks, the treasury
ministry, government nancial organizations, the stock market and corporate nancial institutions among
others that have been involved in an auction as bidders or as auctioneers. Other cases may include banks
that are being auctioned or nancial instruments such as the government securities (bonds) that are the
objects being auctioned.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember, that as much as this research is a historical survey of Colombian
auctions, every day more and more auctions are being held in Colombias nancial sector.
19More information at http://www.larepublica.com.co/archivos/TECNOLOGIA/2010-06-23/procuraduria-da-via-libre-al-
tercer-canal_103448.ph (In Spanish)
20More information about the newspaper can be consulted at http://www.eltiempo.com/. (In Spanish)
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4.1 Granahorrar State-owned Bank Auction
4.1.1 General
On October 31st 2005, the national government held an auction to sell 97.78% of the capital of the state-
owned bank Granahorrar21 ; a bank with more than 20 years of experience in the mortgage eld in Colombia.
At the time, the country had favorable macroeconomic expectations due to the strong recovery of its nancial
system. The purpose of this auction was the privatization of the bank.
The mechanism used was a sealed-bid rst price auction in the rst round. The remaining bidders had
the chance to participate in a second stage, but with an English design. There was a reserve price xed by
the Fondo de Garantías de Instituciones Financieras(FOGAFIN ), which is in charge of supervising and
providing liquidity to nancial institutions among other functions22 . In the rst round the bidders had to
place their sealed-bid in an urn, as well as the documentation for the Superintendencia Bancaria23(institution
in charge of nancial regulation in Colombia) in another urn, and information about the legal representative
who was making the deal in a third urn. Only the two highest bids in the rst round passed to the second
round, and the others did not have any other chance to bid. The next round started with the highest bid
from the previous round. The rule was that any participant must bid at least more than 2% of the previous
highest bid, to continue participating or to win the auction. The rounds lasted until the second last bidder
retired; this means that the second last bidder wasnt willing to bid more than 2% more than its previous
bid.
The reserve price xed by FOGAFIN was COP $430,000 million. There were 5 bidders (banks) allowed
to participate in the auction, these were: Santander bank, BBVA-Colombia, Bank of Bogota, Colpatria and
Davivienda (also banks).
4.1.2 Results
The day of the auction no representative agent from the Santander bank appeared, despite they paid the
right to take part and they were considered a potential bidder. The rst round started and the four remaining
participants (BBVA, Bogota Bank, Colpatria and Davivienda) placed their sealed bids as well as the other
documents in the three urns.
All the bids were reviewed privately by the delegate and were: Colpatria with COP $623,333 million,
21This bank merged with the BBVA bank in 2006 as a result of the auction. For further information about this topic visit
the following website in Spanish, http://www.bbva.com.co/?http://www.bbva.com.co/salapren/notasprensa/r35nota003.htm.
22For further information see the following website https://www.fogan.gov.co/Web/Formularios/Public/Home/frmHome.aspx.
23More information in Spanish, about the institution functions can be check at http://www.supernanciera.gov.co/.
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Bogota bank with COP $704,000 million, BBVA with COP $813,000 million and nally Davivienda with
COP $857,112 million. With all the bids being higher than the reserve price and as result only BBVA and
Davivienda passed to the second round, this was a policy of the government that only allowed the two highest
bidders on the second stage.
In the second round the base price was COP $857,112 million, the highest bid of the rst round. BBVA
placed a sealed-bid of COP $930,000 million. Then it continued with Davivienda making a bid of COP
$950,000 million. Later on BBVA made a nal bid which Davivienda could not surpass, COP $970,000
million. With BBVA as the winner of the auction acquiring Granahorrar for more than 2.23 times the
value24 and becoming the second strongest bank in the country after Bancolombia.
4.1.3 Conclusions
The results show that the mechanism held by the national government was a competitive auction, with two
potential bidders, Davivienda and BBVA and other two weaker bidders. Plus it did not show any symptoms
of entry deterrence or predatory behavior, neither theoretically because it is a seal-bid auction or empirically
as showed in the auction process.
The adjudication price was high compared to the reserve price, which makes this a successful and optimal
auction, since the goal for the national government was to raise the highest quantity of money and to
adjudicate Granahorrar to an experienced bank in the mortgage eld as BBVA.
The results seem to provide an intuition about the e¢ ciency of the auction, since the entity who won
the auction was a bank with such experience and resemblance in the international arena. In fact, the BBVA
bought some banks in other countries gaining experience and learning how protable this bussiness was
internationally. Nevertheless, it is di¢ cult to go beyond that intuition.
4.2 Operations of Open Market for Transitory Expansion (OMA: Repo)
4.2.1 General
The operations undertaken by the Banco de la República, Central Bank of Colombia and monetary author-
ity25 , to expand or contract the monetary supply in the economy are known as the OMA. Usually, they
undertake the REPO operations for a transitory expansion when they need to increase the monetary supply.
24Data can be consulted at the following article in Spanish or in English (but with fewer data),
http://historico.elpais.com.co/historico/nov012005/ECO/A601N1.html, http://www.bnamericas.com/news/banking/BBVA_
wins_Granahorrar_auction_with_US*424mn_bid.
25For further information see the following website http://www.banrep.gov.co/index_eng.html
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The mechanism used for the loan is a multi-unit auction that works like a sealed bid auction (similar to a
uniform auction), and it uses an electronic system for placing the bids.
In the rst place, the Central Bank (when money supply expands) decides the expansion quota and the
maturity term of the REPO (there can be short and long terms for maturity), or the term in which the
agent has to repurchase the nancial title that he lends as collateral. Next, the nancial agents (bidders)
place their bids in an electronic system called ENS26 , which is regulated by the bank, bidding the amount
of money that they would like to borrow and also the e¤ective interest rate that they are willing to pay. All
the bidders face uncertainty about the bids that other nancial agents make.
Meanwhile, the bank receives all the bids and organizes them from the highest to the lowest e¤ective
interest rate, where demand equals the supply (quota for expansion) the winners price is set, that is the
lowest rate bid by the winners (where demand and supply are in equilibrium).
Also, bidders have to give to the bank some kind of nancial title as collateral (with the same value of
the loan), and when the maturity term ends, the bidders who won have to repurchase the title at a xed
price (taking into account the interest rate).
These operations are undertaken almost daily and the terms vary depending on the transitory expansion
that the bank requires, the most common is the one day REPO. The process is exactly the opposite when
the bank is contracting the money supply but the nancial operation is called reverse REPO.
4.2.2 Results
The Central Bank runs this type of auction on a monthly basis. For the purpose of this survey, we are going
to analyze only one of these auctions.
On May 3rd 2010, the bank held a one day maturity term REPO auction, where 39 bids were made by
all the intermediaries mentioned in the table below. The price that each had to pay was an e¤ective interest
rate of 3%. The results were as follows:
Table 5: Open Market Operations for Transitory Expansion
26Further information about this electronic system can be consulted in the following website
http://www.banrep.gov.co/payment_system/ps_sen.htm.
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O¤ers Presented O¤ers Approved
E¤ective Rate (%)
Term (days) Nominal Value (COP$) Min. Max. Nominal Value (COP$) E¤ective Cut Rate (%)
1 2,239,707,000,000.00 3.000 4.000 2,239,707,000,000.00 3.000
Total 2,239,707,000,000.00 2,239,707,000,000.00
Intermediaries Number of Bids Ammount bidded (loan COP$)
Commercial banks 28 2,174,000,000,000.00
Bussiness nancial companies 2 10,000,000,000.00
Trust companies 3 14,200,000,000.00
Stock brokerage 6 1,172,000,000,000.00
Source and calculations: Banco de la República de Colombia.
As illustrated in the chart above, the total amount auctioned was a nominal value (the monetary sum
paid at the maturity of a nancial instrument) of COP $2,239,707,000,000. The bids or bid points rewarding
a rate-quantity pair, show that the minimum rate bid was 3%, the maximum was 4% and the e¤ective cut
rate was 3% (loan interest rate for all investors).
In this case nobody was left out and everyone received a part of the expansion quota. This kind of
mechanism (uniform auction) clearly shows the advantages that a bidding process could bring to the central
bank. For example, it is easy to think how bidders, worried about losing this auction, could try to increase
their chances by bidding a higher e¤ective rate even if they lose prot.
In this case, all bids were between 3% and 4% and all the expansion quota was lent to the bidders27 .
4.2.3 Conclusions
Uniform auctions can be a very useful tool in monetary policy. Therefore, this type of auctions had the
advantage that they could raise loan rates substantially. This happens because, the uncertainty that bidders
are facing, ends up changing their behavior towards aggressive bidding (this doesnt mean that it is more
protable than other multiunit auctions, it depends, there is no general ranking).
All the bidders face liquidity issues and this dynamic is the central incentive for this type of auction to
work, the nancial cost that they face when they bid for a REPO is the opportunity cost that they face for
27All the results were taken from http://www.banrep.gov.co/informes-economicos/ine_sub_repmay.htm, more auction re-
sults can found there, but the entire content is in Spanish.
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immediate liquidity, therefore allocating these loans by auction is very protable. Is it always the best way
to allocate the REPO? The answer is that it depends, as always, on Economics. The uniform auction has
the advantage that it promotes participating and avoids entry deterrence and predation (also collusion, see
Klemperer, 2003), this means that weaker bidders have a chance to win with a lower interest rate, but on
the other hand this could end in lower prot (lower rates) for the bank. Also, this auction is ine¢ cient in
that bidders want to make a prot and they would not bid their entire valuations. Although, these revenue
problems can a¤ect the central bank basically, because collusion could lead to even lower rates for loans,
a¤ecting their interest incomes.
4.3 Class B TES Bonds in Colombian Pesos
4.3.1 General
The TES are Colombian national treasury bonds that are sold by an auction mechanism in the primary
market28 . This is one of the most popular ways to nance the governments scal decit. There are 3 types
of TES: bonds in USD, bonds in COP and bonds in RVU29 .
The way the auction works is similar to the Uniform auction. At rst, the Ministerio de Hacienda y
Crédito Publico (treasury ministry of the government30), according to their decit, sets a quota that is the
maximum amount of money that will be borrowed (nominal value). Then the central bank, who organizes
the auction, uses its electronic system (ENS ) for collecting the bids, where every bidder only knows its own
bid.
The bids consist of e¤ective interest rates and amounts of money that the bidders have available (for
investment) at that moment. The rates are organized from lowest to highest and the equilibrium price is
set where the decit quota matches the supply. The highest rate of the winners is the rate paid to all the
winners. However, bidders could bid a very high rate to get more prot, but if the government doesnt agree
with the bids they can end the auction and keep the TES. There is also a minimum money o¤er that could
be bid to get a TES.
These auctions are held 3 or 4 times a month and the number of bidders participating is xed by the
government during the entire year. The selection of bidders is undertaken by the treasury ministry each year
through a program called Market Creators and the selection is based on their performance in the primary
28Auction regulations can be found in Spanish at http://www.banrep.gov.co/reglamentacion/rg_subastas.htm#tes.
29The Real Value Unit is a unit of account that shows the acquisition power of de Colombian pesos and
is based on the IPC Colombian index (consumer price index). For further information and history, check
http://www.banrep.gov.co/statistics/sta_cppu.htm.
30Their o¢ cial website is http://www.minhacienda.gov.co/MinHacienda/MinistryFinance.
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market (i.e. where and asset is sold for the rst time) and secondary market (i.e. market where assets are
resold). Their function is to provide liquidity in the secondary market and also to study the local government
debt and provide the best nancial conditions in the capital market. In 2010, 14 nancial institutions were
members of this program, 10 of them as market creators and 4 as candidates to market creators. These are
listed below:
Table 6: Market Creators Program in 2010
Market Creators Candidates to Market Creators
Davivienda Bank Correval
Bancolombia The Royal Bank of Scotland





JP Morgan Corporación Financiera S.A
Bogotá Bank
Citibank
Source: Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Publico.
4.3.2 Results
These auctions are run constantly all year long and they have been held for a long time. This survey is
only going to show one of the many share auctions held by the treasury ministry. On April 28, 2010, the
government auctioned TES securities for a xed quota and the results were as follows:
Table 7: Class B TES Bonds Auction Results
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E¤ective Rate (%)
Term (days) Maturity Nominal Value (COP$) Min. Max. Cut Rate (%) Price
4 17-04-2013 153,623,900,000.00 6.500 7.300 6.974 97.641
7 15-06-2016 146,441,000,000.00 7.700 8.500 8.067 102.43
16 24-07-2024 84,119,600,000.00 8.400 9.000 9.000 118.878





Note: Maturity is based on the following dates format (DD-MM-YY) and the bond price is in basis points.
Source and calculations: Banco de la República de Colombia.
The table above summarizes all the auction characteristics, for instance the rst column (Term) show
the years left until the bonds expiration. The second column shows the maturity of the bond, this is the
day when the bond expires and the last coupon is paid to the owner. The next column is the nominal value
per bond type, this is the value paid to the bond owner in the maturity. The last 4 columns refer to the
interest rate (return rate that investors expect to gain), its minimum and its maximum, the cut rate (is the
rate where the market clears, all investors receive this return) and the bonds price, shown in basic points
(measured use in the stock exchange market). Finally, the columns below show the amount that each bidder
bid in the auction.
The e¤ective rates of equilibrium for the TES with maturity terms of 4, 7 and 16 years were 6,974%,
8,067% and 8,590%, respectively31 . The highest nominal value approved was COP $153,623,900,000 with its
corresponding e¤ective cut rate 6,974%. We can see a relation between the nominal value and the e¤ective
rate, in this case the higher the nominal value approved, the lower the e¤ective rate turns out. This can also
be linked to the term of maturity.
31All the results were taken from http://www.banrep.gov.co/informes-economicos/ine_sub_tesb.htm, more auction results
can found there, but the entire content is in Spanish.
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4.3.3 Conclusions
The whole idea and results that the uniform auction can bring are the same as in the case of the REPO
auction. On the other hand, there is little di¤erence in the behavior that bidders could have in this scenario.
Imagine the following dilemma in choosing a mechanism, the government makes the decision, due to the
higher gap between international bank rates (e.g. IMF ) and local market rates o¤ered by investors, that
the best way to nance their decit is through treasury bonds. They would like to choose a mechanism
which leads to less collusion, no predation, no entry deterrence criteria and of course for lower interest
rates. Two viable candidates are Uniform auction and English multiunit auction. If the bank chooses the
uniform auction it is clear that the bank is trading a more competitive mechanism (English auction) but
more likely to fail in the problems named above (Klemperer, 2002 ), for a more robust mechanism (in the
sense mentioned above) but intuitively less attractive. Therefore, in open scenarios, bidding could lead to
lower rates and in sealed scenarios could lead to few lower bids. The incentive here is that with a collusion
problem, the auction could turn out to be a asco and with higher nancial costs than the one expected
(Klemperer, 2003 ), so thats why a uniform auction could be a much less risky mechanism to use. If it
chooses the ascending auction, its nancial cost may tend to lower rates more than they could expect using
other mechanisms.
What to do? Is this a general dilemma or does it depend on the government environment and market?
Theoretically, this could be seen as a general dilemma, practically it depends on the context. As mentioned
earlier, uniform auctions allow weaker bidders to have a chance of winning. This implies, that the weak
bidders (i.e. the ones interested in winning with higher rates) will tend to participate trying to win a bond
to trade it in the secondary market (usually in nancial markets) and this will increase competitiveness
in the bids leading to lower rates32 . However, the market structure is an important factor to analyze the
theoretical properties of uniform auctions and the consequences in topics such as e¢ ciency and optimality33 .
4.4 FRECH Auction
4.4.1 General
The FRECH34 is the fund for mortgage portfolio stabilization. Its function is to provide liquidity for
commercial banks for them to lend money in mortgage loans. For instance, think of a person who asks for
32See Villaneda, F. and Espinosa, Miguel A. (2011), Cardozo, P. (2010), Santamaria, N. and Beltran, H. (2002) and Santa-
maria, N. and Alvarado, J. (2005) for general details about bonds allocation.
33See Villaneda, F. and Espinosa, Miguel A. (2011).
34For further information see the following website in Spanish, http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2004/agosto/23/17232004.htm.
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a mortgage. The bank, needing liquidity to respond to the demand, with the help of a securitization of
mortgages, issues mortgage titles taking the real estate as collateral. These mortgage titles have no liquidity
in the resale market so they need to nd a way to exchange them for a more liquid monetary aggregate.
Therefore, the FRECH, that is part of the Banco de la República (Colombias Central Bank), organizes
weekly auctions, selling Colombian treasury bonds (TES ) only in exchange for these mortgage titles.
However, the idea of this exchange is to enter the banks REPO expanding operations and use the TES
as collateral for gaining liquidity, or to resell them on the secondary market.
The auction mechanism is an electronic auction with the same characteristics as a Uniform auction. In
rst place, the FRECH sets a x amount of TES for the auction and an exchange rate, for example 90 TES
for one mortgage title. Then, the bidders that are usually 5 commercial banks or less set their bids that are
represented in nancial costs for purchasing the Bond. The banks that are willing to pay higher nancial
costs are the ones who win the auction.
As always, the FRECH organizes the bids from the highest nancial cost to the lowest and when the
amount of bonds equals the demand, of that moment, they set the equilibrium price as the lowest nancial
cost of the winners.
Note that this mechanism of getting a marketable nancial asset is a way of adquiring the possibility of
changing these bonds as collateral in the REPO operations. These Bonds also have a short term maturity,
usually seven days. These auctions are held, on average, 4 times a month.
4.4.2 Results
As mentioned in the sections above (TES and REPO auctions), the Central bank has held this type of
auction more than once but in this survey we will only concentrate on one.
This auction took place on April 23rd, 2010. Only 4 bidders participated and the nancial cost that was
set to be the price for all winners was 0.020. The results were as follows:
Table 8: FRECH Auction Results
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O¤ers Presented O¤ers Approved
Financial Cost (bids)
Term (days) NV (Million COP$) Min. Max. NV (Million COP$) Financial Cost (Cut)
7 400,000.00 0.020 0.050 400,000.00 0.020
Total 400,000.00 400,000.00
Intermediaries Number of Bids CVP (Million COP$)
Commercial banks 4 400,000.00
Note: NV means Nominal Value and CVP means Cost of Value Presented.
Source and calculations: Banco de la República de Colombia.
The table above shows the minimum and maximum nancial costs in the auction. It also shows the
Equilibrium nancial cost (where supply meets demand), that is the cost charged to all the bidders, the bids
presented by the commercial banks and the nominal value.
All bidders participating won the auction and the nominal value of the cost presented in the bids, was
COP $400,000 million. Although, the highest nancial cost was 0.050, the price paid by all of the bidders
was 0,020 (the lowest bid)35 . This is how uniform auctions work by changing biddersbehavior and pushing
them to bid higher.
4.4.3 Conclusions
The FRECH doesnt hold auctions very often. The uniform auction design has the advantage that it is fair
for all competitors and also for the reputation of the bank (transparency), in the sense that all bidders have
to pay the lowest nancial cost despite the fact that each of them (winners), had bid higher nancial costs.
In theory, this mechanism has its own results and advantages due to the rules behind the design; if
the seller (bank) decides to change the rules at the end, and charge every bidder for what they bid, the
structure of the bidding behavior would change for the next auction that the FRECH undertakes. This may
damage the behavior strategies for future auctions of this type, resulting in lower prots for the bank and
less credibility. Finally, as Table 8 shows, there were only 4 bids placed and they could have been placed
by less than 4 banks. This issue could show a lack of competitivenes resulting in a low equilibrium price
(Financial cost). Intuitively, optimality could be a¤ected by the lack of entry.
35All the results were taken from http://www.banrep.gov.co/informes-economicos/ine_sub_frech.htm, more auction results
can found there, but the entire content is in Spanish.
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4.5 Call Option Auction
4.5.1 General
The intention of this auction is for Colombias Central Bank to sell the option or right of buying USD from
the bank under certain conditions. Nevertheless, this auction is rarely run by the bank, and it is not used
unless the demand for US currency exceeds the supply.
This behavior can be considered as risk aversion behavior; because participating bidders are willing to
pay a risk prime to guarantee that they can buy dollars when the Market exchange rate (TRM ) is at a certain
level that compromises his investment. For example, an importer who makes some nancial projections for
a deal using a certain exchange rate lets say COP $1800 to 1 dollar, which results in some prot, is willing
to pay a risk prime for exchange rate uctuations. If the rate devaluates to COP $1820 , then the importers
prot increases. The problem is that at some point of devaluation the deal is not protable, but at the
current time it is, so the importer would be willing to buy dollars and one possibility is that commercial
banks have no currency supply. This means that the importer is subject to market supply.
Here, is where this option of having the right to buy dollars from the central bank at a specic market
exchange rate, works. This auction consists in a number of bidders who o¤er a prime bid by electronic media,
where by they pay an amount per dollar for getting the call option, and the amount of dollars that they
want to buy. Each bid is only known by whoever placed it, and the bank organizes the bids in a descending
order. When the xed amount of dollars equals the demand, at that point, they set the equilibrium price as
the lowest prime bid placed by the winners. This auction is similar to a uniform auction.
The only condition to exercise the right is that in the term that the option is available, usually during
the next 30 days after the auction, the Average Mobil (MA(20)) from the last 20 days, has to be below
the current market exchange rate (TRM ). If that happens, the option is enabled, if not it is disabled. This
means, that the TRM series has to be growing for the option to be enabled, because the only way the MA(20)
is lower than the current TRM is when it is increasing.
4.5.2 Results
This survey will only show the result of the auction ran on February 12th 2009. In the auction 40 bidders
gave their demand for dollars and their prime risk that could be seen as the price for each xed amount of
dollars, for instance, COP $1000 for each USD $100 being demanded. The results were as follows:
Table 9: Call Option Auction Results
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O¤ers Presented O¤ers Approved
Prime Value (bid)
LDE Nominal Value (USD) Min. Max. Nominal Value (USD) Prime Value Cut
12-03-2009 599,800,000.00 1,500.00 28,500.00 180,000,000.00 8,700.00
Total 599,800,000.00 180,000,000.00
Intermediaries Number of Bids Cost of Value Presented (USD)
Commercial banks 33 505,200,000.00
Financial corporations 5 94,000,000.00
Bussiness nancial companies 2 600,000.00
Total 40 599,800,000.00
Note: LDE means Limit Date for Exercise and the dates format is (DD-MM-YY).
Source and calculations: Banco de la República de Colombia.
The columns shown in the table above may be interpreted the same way as in the TES auction. The
only di¤erence is that the bid is not in terms of return rates, it is in terms of Colombian pesos (prime value).
Meanwhile, the rst row in the date column refers to the maturity of the option.
Notice that in this case there is a high number of bidders participating and that could explain why the
maximum prime bid is so high compared to the minimum bid, taking into account the risk aversion. The
uncertainty of other biddersbehavior is an incentive for the other competitors to bid higher values than
usual, when there are less bidders, they wouldnt have thought considered it. The result here was a prime
cut of COP $8,700 pesos for a dollar supply of $180,000,00036 .
4.5.3 Conclusions
As the results show, the di¤erence between the highest and the lowest bid is considerably large, this says
something about the auction mechanism. First it should be taken into account that the prizes of the auction
are homogeneous nancial derivatives. The same denition of this nancial instrument can lead us think
that the participant bidders are somehow risk adverse bidders. Therefore, they are willing to pay a risk
prime for avoiding less prot due to exchange rate issues.
36All the results were taken from http://www.banrep.gov.co/informes-economicos/ine_sub_opci_inmer.htm, more auction
results can found there, but the entire content is in Spanish.
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Second, the bidders are not maximizing their expected payo¤, in this case it is a utility function that
represents risk aversion. Hence, the less utility that a lower bid represents (lower probability to win) for a
bidder, it is lower than the utility a bidder loses with a lower payo¤.
Finally, the two issues mentioned above and the fact that in this case the number of bidders is large
enough, can explain part of the behavior that this uniform auction presents. Also, collusion issues and
entry problems (predation and entry deterrence) are of no importance here because of the number of bidders
participating.
As a main conclusion, the uniform auction for this scenario is quite a successful choice with high expected
revenue.
4.6 Put Option Auction
4.6.1 General
Put Option Auctions are the opposite of Call Option Auctions.They give a person the right to sell US dollars
to the Central Bank also under certain conditions. In this case, the condition is that if the option is available,
lets say during the next 30 days after de auction, the Average Mobil (MA(20)) has to be above the market
exchange rate (TRM ) for the option to be enabled.
If an exporter who made a deal in US dollars is projecting his prots with a current exchange rate, and
this rate starts to uctuate aggressively, the exporters prots could be reduced if he cant sell the dollars at
the right time. This is why he would be willing to pay a prime risk where he establishes, that if the exchange
rate reaches a certain level, he can use this Put Option and the Bank will have to buy his dollars at the
market exchange rate of the day, given that the MA(20) condition enabled the option.
This auction is similar to a Uniform Auction. The way this auction works is the same as Call Option
Auction. The bank receives bids through its electronic system SEBRA 37 , where each bidder bids the prime
risk that he will pay and the amount of dollars he wants to sell. Thus, the Central Bank organizes the primes
in a descending order and where xed bank demand for dollars equals the supply. The equilibrium prime
that would be the lowest prime bid by the winners is set at that point.
4.6.2 Results
The central bank has used Put Option Auctions many times (including the Call Option Auction) to control
exchange rate volatility. Here, this survey will only present one particular auction.
37Further information in Spanish about the SEBRA electronic system can be consulted at http://www.banrep.gov.co/sistema-
nanciero/seb_sebra.htm.
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On July 22nd, 2009, the Central Bank ran this auction where 44 bids were received and the cut prime
was COP $9100. The results showing the quota per dollar demand is shown in the following table:
Table 10: Put Option Auction Results
O¤ers Presented O¤ers Approved
Prime Value (bid)
LDE Nominal Value (USD) Min. Max. Nominal Value (USD) Prime Value Cut
21-08-2009 819,100,000.00 2,000.00 15,850.00 180,000,000.00 9,100.00
Total 819,100,000.00 180,000,000.00
Intermediaries Number of Bids Cost of Value Presented (USD)
Commercial banks 37 743,800,000.00
Financial corporations 5 74,000,000.00
Bussiness nancial companies 2 1,300,000.00
Total 44 819,100,000.00
Note: LDE means Limit Date for Exercise and the dates format is (DD-MM-YY).
Source and calculations: Banco de la República de Colombia.
The columns and rows in the chart can be interpreted the same way as in the Call Option Auction. These
results show the same behavior as seen in the Call option auction; a common result in uniform auctions.
The maximum is very di¤erent from the minimum bid because of risk aversion and the 44 bids presented.
Both the Put and Call Option Auctions, had the same nominal value approved (USD $180,000,000) but
the prime of cut was higher in the Put Option Auction38 .
4.6.3 Conclusions
The structure of this auction and the consequences that risk averse bidders (the prize here is also a nancial
derivative) bring to the mechanism design are pretty much the same as in the Call Option Auction.
An advantage that these results of the auction present compared to the ones in the Call Option Auction
is that there are more bidders here. The idea of bidders colluding in clusters seems pretty di¢ cult, because
coordination is almost impossible. Also, the "weaker bidders" have more chances to win in a uniform auction,
38All the results were taken from http://www.banrep.gov.co/informes-economicos/ine_sub_opci_inmer.htm, more auction
results can found there, but the entire content is in Spanish.
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because bids are private information so competitors dont know what others are bidding, and also bidders
tend to shade their bids after the second unit (Krishna, 2009). This doesnt happen in the open format
auction where bids are public.
4.7 FOGAFIN Bonds
4.7.1 General
FOGAFIN39 is a fund that guarantees that nancial institutions can back up peoples savings deposits. One
of its jobs is to invest large amounts of money to provide condence to savers in safe deposit issues. In 1999,
Colombia was su¤ering an economic crisis and many enterprises and banks were bankrupt. The problem
was that neither FOGAFIN nor any other entity could backup the safe deposits of the nancial institutions
due to the crisis. Therefore, the idea was to capitalize all the public nancial institutions that were in crisis
through FOGAFIN, the strategy was to issue banking capitalization bonds as a way to renance the nancial
institutions that were in danger of bankruptcy. The allocation of these bonds was with private o¤ers. Later,
in 2002 and 2003, FOGAFIN and the Central Bank of Colombia decided to run an auction with the idea
that the bidders who win the auction could, later on, market those bonds in the secondary market. The
bidders who participated were market creators, candidates to market creators of public decit titles, the
stock market and some other nancial entities.
The procedure for the auction was the following: rst, the central bank made public how many bonds
in nominal value would be auctioned. Then, they established 2 rounds in which the market creators and
candidates to market creators who won in the rst round, could participate in a second round. Third, all
bidders in the rst round, had to submit 2 types of information in their bid; the rst is the nominal value of
the titles that they are going to demand plus, and second the e¤ective rate that the bidder is willing to bid
to get the bonds.
The mechanism used was the SEBRA electronic system, and every bidder could bid several times for
di¤erent amounts within a period of time. Note that bidders only knew their own bid.
However, the way the objects are allocated depends on the amount of supply made by FOGAFIN and
the e¤ective rates. All the e¤ective rates bid are organized in ascending order, and the price that is common
for every winner (rate of equilibrium) is when supply equals demand.
The way the price of the bond is calculated is important because it determines the value of these on the
market (important for the secondary market). The equation for the cost of the title is the following:
39See the link in the Granahorrar State-owned Bank Auction section.
38
V C = P  V N
V C is the cost value of the title; V N is the nominal value of the title until the day of auction fulllment,








with n= number of capitalization periods until maturity, R is the rate of equilibrium in the auction, coupon
is the interest payment made to the owner and K is the capital value at calculated maturity. This auction
is similar to a Uniform auction and it was held 28 times between 2002 and 2003.
4.7.2 Results
From the 28 auctions that were run, this survey will analyze the one undertaken on May 20th, 2003. Results
of the rst round are presented in the following table:
Table 11: Fogan Bonds Auction Results
Issue Date Maturity (Years) Nominal Value Approved (COP$) Cost Value Approved (COP$)
11-08-1999 6 5,000,000,000.00 5,046,050,000.00
11-08-1999 8 3,000,000,000.00 3,036,030,000.00
28-09-2000 4 5,000,000,000.00 5,100,030,000.00
28-09-2000 6 3,000,000,000.00 5,042,510,000.00
Equilibrium Price Adoption Rate (%) Min. Rate (%) Max. Rate (%)
100.921 9.46 9.46 10.26
101.210 10.02 10.02 10.60
102.006 9.31 9.31 9.70
101.416 9.81 9.46 10.26
Entities Nominal Value (COP$) Participation (%)
Commercial Banks 42,000,000,000.00 100
Total 42,000,000,000.00 100
Note: the operation date was on May 20 0f 2003 and the fulllment date was on May 22 of 2003. Also
the issue date format is (DD-MM-YY) and the equilibrium bond price is in basis points.
Source and calculations: Banco de la República de Colombia.
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The table presented above shows 8 columns. The rst two are about the maturity of the bond and the
day the bond was issued (each row is one bond with its corresponding maturity). The next three columns
corresponds to the total nominal value auction, the cost value (see equation 1 ) and the equilibrium price
of the bond. The last 3 columns refer to the rate of return approved for each bond, and the range bid
(minimum and maximum).
In this particular case, note that all the nominal value approved (supply) was issued to the bidder or
bidders that bid an e¤ective rate of 9,46 (low boundary) in the case of 6 years maturity term of the title
(upper one). The same applies for the 4 year and 6 year term of the title case. Only the bottom 6 year term
title case could reach an approval rate within the boundaries
The lowest equilibrium price was for the top 6 year case, with a price of COP $100.921 and the highest
was the 4 year case with COP $102.00640 .
4.7.3 Conclusions
The bids submitted in this auction seem to be less competitive. we can only determine that the boundaries
in the e¤ective rates are close enough and this issue could be attached to the number of bidders. In this
particular case the uniform auction could be sensitive to collusion (Klemperer, 2002 ), because there is a
huge incentive to submit lower rates because the dirty price of the bond would be higher and there would be
a bigger chance that they could make a prot in the secondary market (of course it depends of the secondary
market situation).
Is there any other more appropriate mechanism? In essence, all mechanisms depend on the context, but
particularly when the number of bidders participating is very low, (less than four bidders, here the number
is xed (20)) , in general auctions are vulnerable to collusion problems and to lack of competitiveness in the
bids. For example, Klemperer (2003), talks about the Netherland 3G auction asco were bidders attendance
was very low, collusion rose and the revenue was one third of the expected income.
Here the problem is lack of competitiveness (concerns about collusion also rise) due to the size of partic-
ipants, therefore, the result could represent a bigger nancial cost for the Central Bank.
40All the results were taken from http://www.banrep.gov.co/informes-economicos/ine_sub_foga.htm, more auction results
can found there, but the entire content is in Spanish.
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4.8 Popular Bank: Hammer Auctions
4.8.1 General
Every month of the year, the private bank called Banco Popular (Popular bank)41 , runs di¤erent types of
auctions according to the object they are selling. The objects for sale in the auctions are classied in 8
categories: furniture and xtures, heavy machinery, electro domestics, real estate properties, vehicles, spare
parts, pipes and scrap. However, most of the time the bank only acts as an auctioneer between buyers and
sellers. The rest of the time is when they sell their own goods, such as real estate property or other kinds of
assets.
There are 4 types of auction ran by the Popular bank and each one is run in a di¤erent frequency. Also,
enabled bidders are those who fullled age requirements (18 years), dont work at the bank and are not
currently facing legal issues; enabled buyers are public entities and individuals.
Wheel Auction
This type of auction is held on a monthly basis by the bank in di¤erent Colombian cities and also some
municipalities. The main characteristic of this auction is that it works as a single unit English auction (single
units could also be packages of homogenous units), but with xed price increases. It also has an initial price
that is set 6 days prior to the auction, and an entry cost that is a 20% deposit of the initial price.
Virtual Auction
The second type of auction run by the bank is called virtual auction and it works in the same way as the
wheel auction with the di¤erence that it is held via internet (weakly)42 , this means that bidders do not have
to be in the same place. A particular issue of this single unit auction is that it operates on a time limit; this
means that a closing time is set for the auction and can only be changed if at the end, when there are less
than 3 minutes left; a bidder overbids the last bid. If that happens, 5 minutes are added to the closing time.
Sealed-Bid Auction
The frequency of this auction depends on how assets are valued in the market and what the o¤ers for
those assets are like. This auction mechanism is the same as a rst price auction, but with the same entry
cost mentioned above and some legal entry requirements. It also has an initial price and bids must be sent
to bank o¢ ces during the deadline period.
41For further information in Spanish about the private bank see the following website https://www.bancopopular.com.co/.
42Virtual auctions are held on this website http://www.elmartillo.com.co/ and also information in Spanish about wheel
auctions is available on the website.
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Sealed-bid Auction with Tie Rule
The last type of auction undertaken by the bank is the same as the sealed-bid auction (i.e. rst price
auction) mentioned above but with a specic tie rule. This means that if two or more sealed bids tie, the
bank has to call the bidders involved and ask them for a new bid to determine the winner, in this case the
process is repeated until one of the bidders wins.
4.8.2 Results
Many auctions are being run daily on the banks website: The advantage of this is that government insti-
tutions such as the treasury of the state can use this public mechanism to make their recruitments. For
example, on July 31st 2010, the treasury ministry used the wheel auction to sell recruitment contracts for
alienation of ttings and xtures. The value of the contract was for COP $80.000 million.
The advantage for the government to use this mechanism is the transparency issue in their recruitments
and also the guarantees that the Popular bank gives to all its users 43 .
Another example of the way these auctions are handled is the entry fee that is required to participate. For
instance, on the 21st of January 2011, the o¢ cial website for auctions, published an auction for a package of
electric articles for a total amount of COP $70 million. The entry fee (20% deposit) required to participated
was of COP $14 million. That fee could generate entry deterrence due to the higher cost.
Finally, this mechanism may present some pitfalls. For example, in October 2010, the public service
enterprise in Colombia called Empresa Distrital de Servicio Públicos 44 was liquidating all its assets, so it
ran an auction, using the wheel mechanism, selling 60 vehicles.
The results showed that they only sold 7 vehicles in the auction for COP $100 million and the reason
they gave for this results was that many of the other vehicles had political issues because they had been
turned into cleaning vehicles (such as dump truck and garbage trunks)45 .
4.8.3 Conclusions
The four auction mechanisms used by the bank are very helpful tools for sellers, as anything can be sold
through auctions, providing there is a solution to the asymmetric information problem. The 4 auctions
provide entry incentives because people can nd the best type for them and avoid entry deterrance. Popular
43For further information in Spanish about the recruitments check the following docu-
ment http://www.contratos.gov.co/archivospuc1/2010/C/113001000/10-12-288608/C_PROCESO_10-12-
288608_113001000_1503832.pdf
44The enterprise no longer exists. Further information in Spanish about its history could be found on the following document
http://www.umng.edu.co/revcieco/2006/PDF%20de%20Corel/Lahistoria.pdf.
45All data was taken from http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-247831. The entire content is in Spanish.
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Bank provides the auction format and the initial price valuation, it also collects initial deposit, nal payments
and if the auction mechanism has the wheel design; it provides o¢ cial supervisors to check its development.
Nevertheless, the wheel auction design is exposed to collusion (very common in English auctions) prob-
lems. As a solution, the bank sends a supervisor to check the development of the auction who has the
power to end the auction or dismiss bidders if necessary. Virtual auctions, on the other hand, could be a
better tool for sellers because they are less exposed to collusion problems (bidders are not in the same place)
and e¢ ciency seems to be achieved in this mechanism in private valuations, because the English auction is
equivalent to a second price auction which is e¢ cient.
Moreover, entry deterrence and predation problems could happen more with the wheel design, so virtual
auctions could be a better choice for important market assets. Also, reserve prices could be a good way
to avoid collusion issues and raise higher revenues. However, reserve prices can also bring problems when
they are misused. For example, Klemperer (2002), showed the reserve price asco in Turkey, where the
government was auctioning two telecom licenses (not at the same time) and it decided to set the reserve
price of the second license (a whole new auction) as the clearing price of the rst auction. The result was
that the winner in the rst auction bid so high that nobody bought the second license (the result was a
monopoly in communications market).
Finally, the biggest concern of these mechanisms is attracting bidders to participate; this could be a
problem because of the 20% deposit entry fee and very high initial prices. Literature has shown that entry
fees and high initial prices that are not well established could result in shoddy auctions.
4.9 Credit Auction: 2007 Case
4.9.1 General
Financial sectors all over the world have taken advantage of the auction properties and their desirable results.
One of these cases is the credit market, in particular the credit default portfolio in the banking sector.
One of the biggest concerns for a nancial institution is to collect its credit portfolio on time. A good
management of this portfolio can be seen in the recovery/balance ratio, sometimes recovering the entire
credit portfolio after a long time may be di¢ cult for some institutions, the time invested and the management
resources could have low recovery rates as a result. In this scenario auctioning the credit portfolio based
on expected revenue is a useful protable resource, the only issue is all the time needed to fulll all the
requirements for portfolio transference.
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In 2007, the CISA institution46 and Fogan47 ran an auction to sell a credit portfolio and some properties.
They made one sole package with all the assets for a total amount of COP $2.60 billion; this included a credit
portfolio with 186000 loans with balance due by COP $2.4 billion and 1 real estate property. They used a
rst price auction with an entry fee of 60 million Colombian pesos and a reserve price. Nevertheless, bidders
entry wasnt an issue, 7 bidders participated (Deutsche bank, Lehman Brothers, Citi Group, Mckinsey &
Co, Morgan Stanley, GE and AIG global investment).
4.9.2 Results
The results from the auction ran on June 15th 2007, are presented in the following table:
Table 12: Credit Auction Results
Bidders 7
Prize Value COP $2.60 billion
Winner AIG Global Investment
Winners Bid COP $595.595 million
Entry Fee COP $60 million
Source: Business News Americas.
The optimality issue was accomplished because Fogan and CISA were expecting at most COP $319.500
million. The winner, months later, after the auction announced publicly that buying credit portfolios is a
protable business48 . All the bidders exceeded the reserve price.
4.9.3 Conclusions
These types of auctions prove the usefulness of auction markets and auction theory. In this case, the lack
of an o¢ cial market where credit portfolios could be sold, showed that auctions are a good and protable
way of selling this assets. The rst price auction, as the results show, is commonly known in literature
as a mechanism for reducing collusion, also in some cases the uncertainty faced by bidders lead to higher
revenues.
46The letters stand for Central de inversiones, which is a nancial institution in charge of credit portfolios and real estate
management. For further information in Spanish visit the following website https://www.centraldeinversiones.com.co/.
47See the Fogan bonds section for more information about this institution.
48Results data (Spanish version) were taken from http://www.bnamericas.com/news/banca/Capital_Recovery_Group_logra_
cartera_de_Cisa_por_US*311mn .
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Accordingly, Fogan and CISA raised almost 200% of the value they expected, this means that the
portfolios value they thought was lower than the markets valuation. To conclude, this particular case
shows how auctions are powerful tools when the avialable information (portfolios valuation) is incomplete.
Particularly, in this case it was the rst time a credit portfolio was auctioned and the revenue objectives
were a priority for the seller, because they needed the money to recover part of their internal default credit
portfolio. Also, as Table 12 shows it was very attractive to auction these types of nancial assets because
many competitors participated.
4.10 Stock Market Auction
4.10.1 General
The Ministerio de Hacienda49 and the Bolsa de Valores de Colombia (BVC )50 in the past few years changed
the stock bargaining model in Colombia. The problem was that the old model wasnt appropriate for foreign
investment because people who wanted to invest had to learn all the Colombian stock market structure
before investing. This was because it didnt work like global standard stock models so it was di¢ cult to
understand. For instance, the price formation wasnt clear, the market frozewhen prices were very high
and stocks allocation among o¤ers was confusing.
The new model was based on the European ring model and the bargaining process was restructured with
auction mechanisms (run daily). However, the bargaining structure is formed by so-called wheels. There
are 2 types of wheels, the rst are the REPO operations (they dont use auction mechanism) and the second
are the Cash transactions (this survey will focus on this one) and they are divided depending on the stocks
liquidity.
First, in the cash transaction type, the bargaining process for liquid stocks is made up of three sessions.
The rst part is the opening setup where no one can trade stocks, but people can withdraw previous orders.
The second part is called open market and it works like an auction. This means that people start making
o¤ers (bidding) and there is an algorithm called CALCE that sets the equilibrium price, based on where
maximum quantity (stocks) is allocated51 .
In this session a range price is set previously and no bids will be accepted outside the range, if the CALCE
algorithm, when setting the equilibrium price, nds two possible equilibrium prices on the boundaries a
49See TES auction section for further information about this institution.
50The BVC is the stock Exchange from Colombia. For further information in Spanish visit the following website
http://www.bvc.com.co/.
51All the stock market model and the CALCE algorithm can be review in Spanish at the following website
http://www.bvc.com.co/cursos/mostrarpagina.jsp?codpage=21.
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volatility auction starts and the bargaining process stops while the Volatility Auction (usually they are 2
minutes and 30 seconds long) is going on. The idea of this Volatility auction is to reset the boundaries and
the reference price; this is possible due to bids because if one of the transactions that are being made exceeds
the USD $7000 the system automatically resets the boundaries on the volatility auction52 . Finally, the third
session is the auction closure where a closure price is set which then becomes the reference for the next day.
The price is set in the same way as it is on the open market; that is CALCE algorithm.
Moreover, on the wheel type cash transaction, the bargaining structure for the non-liquid stocks is
di¤erent. In this case, there are 2 sessions, an auction opening session and a closure session. In the rst
session, an opening price is set as well as a reference price for the range price (same as in open market
session), bidding is allowed and equilibrium price is set with the CALCE algorithm. Stock allocation is only
made at the end of the auction (session) and closure of the session is random. The nal session, works in
exactly the same way as the auction closure in the case of liquid stocks.
This type of stock market auctions are very rare mechanisms, but it can be said that the auctions
undertaken on the open market sessions work in a similar way to a Uniform price auction. This is because
the CALCE algorithm sets a common price for the stocks allocation; this means that bidders can pay the
same price for di¤erent amounts of the same goods.
4.10.2 Results
Although the global crisis has a¤ected the nancial markets, in Colombia, the stock market indexes have
been growing since 2009. The Colombian market has improved due to the new stock market model among
other countries. The following charts show 3 nancial indexes and the volatility of one of the biggest indexes
in Colombia (IGBC index 53).
52This rule is called Price marking.
53More information in Spanish about the index data and its methodology can be consulted at
http://www.bvc.com.co/pps/tibco/portalbvc#.
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Source: Bolsa de Valores de Colombia
Calculations: Authors
Source: Bolsa de Valores de Colombia
Calculations: Authors
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Source: Bolsa de Valores de Colombia
Calculations: Authors
Source: Bolsa de Valores de Colombia
Calculations: Authors
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As a result54 the indexes grew from October 2009, to the end of last year and volatility has increased
but this can happen because of the nancial crisis which has a¤ected the whole world.
Another way of seeing the auction results in the stock market model context is checking the transaction
volumes and the index performances. In November 2010, the Colombian stock market reported that stock
transactions had exceeded COP $4.8 billion (this result doesnt include the REPO operations only cash
transactions) one of the greatest values of the year. Finally, the IGBC index (one of the most important in
Colombia) in the same period reported an increase of 8.1% for a total of 36,5% in the entire year, as reported
by Bloomberg55 .
4.10.3 Conclusions
The biggest concern in this scenario is optimality concern because, the older model that the stock market
used was in some way blocking foreign investment due to its complexity. With the new model, structured
through complex auction designs and based on the European model, optimality issues were solved because
it became easier for foreigners to invest in a stock market with the same structure as the standard ones.
As an example of the results this new auction stock market achieved, on the 22nd of November 2010
the capital markets of Chile, Peru and Colombia merged to achieve the rst nancial platform in Latin
America56 .
Although, e¢ ciency isnt the biggest concern of this design, it has some important features, for example
the CALCE algorithm looks for the biggest welfare allocation. Meaning that the equilibrium price will be
set where the biggest amount of operations are being handle of (where demand and o¤er are the nearest to
the equilibrium).
Finally, the volatility auction is an excellent tool to regulate prices because it can reset the price range
according to market needs. In contrast to the old mechanism where the market freezes and all the transactions
stop. Also, the Volatility Auction is a way to regulate nancial operations in the stock exchange, showing
the many ways auction designs can be implemented for a wide variety of economic topics.
54Results (Spanish version) were taken from http://www.duagraria.gov.co:8090/archivos/Boletin%20mercado%2043.pdf.
55 Ibid., p.3




Others, is understood as all the auctions for di¤erent services, assets, food, art or animals, which have no
relation to the Financial, Electric and Gas, or Communication industries. This is done to show the diversity
of auctions held in Colombia, how di¤erent objects can be adjudicated throughout auctions, and the savings
that can be achieved with their implementation.
5.1 Computers for Education (Computadores para Educar CPE) Auction
5.1.1 General
Since the year 2000, the government implemented CPE57 auctions yearly in order to donate computers
to the low income population, generating savings and improving the computer supplier system. Another
objective of CPE is reducing the digital gap and the lack of knowledge in some regions of Colombia with
the intention of ensuring a better level of education and major access to technology. This document is
focused on the auctions held in two di¤erent years (2008 and 2009 ). Each year di¤erent auctions were held
for di¤erent computer parts. It should be pointed out, that despite the fact that these auctions include
computer systems, they are included in this section and not in the Communications industry, because the
goal of these auctions was to ensure a higher level of education for the poor and not to adjudicate any license
concerning communications at all.
In 2008, the type of mechanism implemented for CPE was an inverse Dutch auction. Through auctions
the government expects the procedure to be held in a public and transparently. In these types of auctions
there is a reserve price (in this case is also a starting price), where the bidders place their bids, and the one
with the lowest bid, wins.
This year the government held auctions for partial computers: 4 di¤erent auctions58 with the idea of
acquiring 3 items: PC, monitors and kits which contained keyboard, mouse, speakers and microphone. The
rst item was divided into two auctions (two lots); in the rst, 10,872 dual core processors were auctioned
and in the second, 8,128 single core processors, all with the respective mother board and RAM. In the third
auction 16,500 monitors were auctioned and in the fourth approximately 23,500 computer kits.
CPE also held auctions for complete computers with the purpose of minimizing computer costs. The
computers were divided into two di¤erent lots of 13,424 and 13,423, taking into account that the same bidder
could not win both lots. This was more like a discriminatory multiunit auction (2 units/ 2 lots).
57More information at www.computadoresparaeducar.gov.co (In Spanish)
58More information in Sanz, Andres F. (2010) (In Spanish)
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In 2009, the type of auctions held were Dutch auctions for only one lot, with the di¤erence that the
reduction of the bids had to have a di¤erence of 0.5%. For more than one lot auctions were similar to
Discriminatory open auctions, with the two lowest bids being adjudicated with a lot, paying a price equal
to each ones bid. These auctions were for partial computers and had exactly the same 3 items. For the
rst item the single core processors were divided into 3 lots: the rst two acquired in the same auction had
13,500 and the last one had 6,488 in a di¤erent auction in which the winners of the rst auction could not
participate. Fort he second item the kits were divided into 3 lots: all with 13,094 keyboards, 13,357 mouse,




The rst auction for partial computers had 7 participants, the budget or reserve price for the totality of
processors was approximately COP $3,178.5 million, the adjudication price was COP $2,536.8 million, with
savings of COP $641.68 million (20% of the budget).
The second auction for partial computers had 7 participants, the budget or reserve price for the totality
of processors was approximately COP $1,805.3 million, the adjudication price was COP $1,376.5 million,
with savings of COP $428.74 million (23.7% of the budget).
The third auction for partial computers had 6 participants, the budget or reserve price for the totality of
monitors was approximately COP $3,807.3 million, the adjudication price was COP $2,681.8 million, with
savings of COP $1,125.5 million (29.6% of the budget).
The fourth auction for partial computers had 4 participants, the budget or reserve price for the totality of
kits was approximately COP $1,224.6 million, the adjudication price was COP $1,139 million, with savings
of COP $85.6 million (7% of the budget).
These results are best shown in the following table:
Table 13: 2008 Auction Results
Auction # # of Bidders Budget (Million COP$) Adjudication Price (Million COP$) Saving (%)
1 7 3,178.50 2,536.80 20.2
2 7 1,805.30 1,376.50 23.8
3 6 3,807.30 2,681.80 29.6
4 4 1,224.60 1,139.00 7
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Source: Sanz (2010). Tesis Universidad de los Andes: Análisis de los
Sistemas de subastas de "Computadores para educar".
The two auctions for complete computers had a total budget of COP $25,531.5 million; the rst auction
had an adjudication price of COP $12,388 million and the second COP $12,381 million, for a total of COP
$24,769 million, with total savings of COP $762.56 million (3% of the budget).
b) 2009 Auctions
The rst auction for the rst item (two lots of processors) had 8 participants; the budget or reserve price
for the two lots was approximately COP $13,211.2 million. The adjudication price for the rst lot was COP
$5,595 million and COP $5,600.67 million for the second lot, for a total of COP $11,195.67 million; with
savings of COP $2,015.4 million (15.25% of the total budget).
The second auction for the rst item had 6 participants, the budget or reserve price was approximately
COP $3,413.5 million, the adjudication price was COP $3,000 million, with savings of COP $413.5 million
(12.1% of the budget).
The auction for the second item had only 4 participants for the 3 lots, the budget or reserve price for the
three lots was approximately COP $2,068 million, the adjudication price for the rst lot was COP $685.14
million, COP $686 million for the second lot and COP $686.4 million for the third lot; for a total of COP
$2,057.5 million, with total savings of COP $10.51 million (0.5% of the total budget).
The auction for the third item had 9 participants for the 3 lots, the budget or reserve price for the three
lots was approximately COP $10,807.4 million, the adjudication price for the rst lot was COP $2,091.24
million, COP $2,495 million for the second lot and COP $2,499.44 million for the third lot; for a total of
COP $7,085.68 million, with total savings of COP $3,721.73 million (34.4% of the total budget).
The results are summarized below:
Table 14: 2009 Auction Results
Auction # # of Bidders Budget (Million COP$) Adjudication Price (Million COP$) Saving (%)
1 8 13,211.20 11,196.67 15.2
2 4 2,068.00 2,057.50 0.5
3 9 10,807.40 7,085.68 34.4
Source: Sanz (2010) Tesis Universidad de los Andes: Análisis de los
Sistemas de subastas de "Computadores para educar".
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5.1.3 Conclusions
Results of CPE auctions held on 2008 and 2009 show that one of the main objectives, generating savings,
was fully achieved. Although acquiring computers by parts include some default risk which may a¤ect the
delivery of the computers and the failure of the CPE program.
In the 2008 auctions for processors, the winner of the rst auction could participate in the second one,
which increases the default risk, as well as the probability of collusion; for example the winner of the rst
auction colluding in order to let other to win the second auction, if the other contributed bidding in a way
that the rst had won the rst auction.
This mistake was corrected for the auctions of complete computers in 2008, and in 2009 for partial
computers, where a participant could only win one lot.
The savings for partial computers in 2008 were higher than with complete computers because some rms
may have been specialized in certain parts of the computers, making the auction more competitive. This
was fully corrected in 2009 where only partial computer auctions were held and as a result, there were more
savings and less risk.
Holding similar auctions year after year increases the possibility that the participants learn and modify
their strategic behavior tending to collude, to raise the adjudication prices. In these auctions entry deterrence
is practiced, due to the fact that few rms can sell high quantity computers and these rms exercise predatory
behavior because of the reputation, and because they had won or participated in previous CPE auctions, so
the participants may always be the same.
5.2 Real-Estate Auction
5.2.1 General
Real-Estate auctions are run in Colombia for di¤erent purposes. Sometimes they are run when debtors cant
pay their mortgages, and the banks, through real-estate apents, auction these properties. Also these kinds of
auctions are made to ensure the sellers an easy, fast way to sell their property at a good price and immediate
liquidity. This also benets buyers who can usually take credits with di¤erent banks to buy the properties.
One of the most important Real-Estate Companies which runs these kinds of auctions is Corral Mal-
donado59 . This rm ran an auction on September 7th 2000 to sell 95 properties in Bogota, Chia, Girardot,
Mosquera, Fusagasuga and Sopo. The price of the propertys ranged between COP $31.8 and COP $480
million and the buyers could request credits with BBVA Bank. This auction is one of the many mechanisms
59More information at http://200.74.129.90/corralmaldonado/index.php (In Spanish)
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used by the rm between 2000 and 2010, with properties all over the country. The rm held their 148th
auction on the 29th of August 2009.
These auctions are held online, and run like English Auctions in which bidders can only observe the
highest bid made. To participate, the bidder must select the properties of interest (the bidder can check
the property physically), and ask for credit if needed. The bidder then, has to make a deposit of around
the 20% of the reserve price established for each property; which is less than the appraised value and would
be returned if the property is not adjudicated. In these auctions, the bidders can participate manually by
placing their bid anytime another raises the bid, or automatically in which the bidders place a maximum
o¤er and the system bids for them.
5.2.2 Results
For the auction held on the 29th of August of 2009, Corral Maldonado reported sales of over COP $1000
million. 33%of the properties sold corresponded to housing estates and the rest of it was distributed among
locals, storage and rural properties. These properties had up to 68% o¤ of their commercial value.
5.2.3 Conclusions
Although this electronic auction is an open auction, bidders dont know the other bidders identities, they
can only observe the highest bid, and so collusion would not be a problem like in other open auctions.
Moreover, there is no entry deterrence because everyone who wants to participate can; however, a bidder
can exercise predatory behavior if a potential bidder bids a really high price that doesnt allow other bidders
to bid anymore, although this will be good for the revenue acquired for the seller and the auctioneer which
is nally one of the principal objectives of these auctions.
These auctions are convenient for everyone involved; the sellers, because they have liquidity and they
can sell their properties at good prices; the buyers, because they have the chance to buy certied properties
at good prices below the commercial appraisal; and the intermediaries, because they have a rent per each
property put on the market. In these auctions, the bidders know the commercial appraisal price; however,
in the English format, bidders could have the winners curse, as they could have paid more than they real
value of the property acquired. This could be due to the fact that the only information they had was the
highest bid made by another bidder and as the results show, the revenue raised compared to the real prices
was high.
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5.3 Procuraduría General Auction
5.3.1 General
On July 7th 2009, the Procuraduría General de la Nación60 , a state entity in charge of supervising public
employees and representing individuals against the state, ran an auction to provide help desk services,
technical support and full maintenance of physical assets and software systems belonging to it in Bogotá and
around the country. This is one of the many tenders this institution holds, but we include it in this survey
as it was advertised as an auction.
This contract was using an electronic descending auction, similar to a rst price sealed-bid descending
auction. This kind of auction is often held by this entity when it requires di¤erent services to avoid problems
of hiring.
The budget available for this was COP $1,000 million. To participate, the auction bidders had to fulll all
the legal and technical conditions stated in the contract specications. They had to deliver 2 closed envelopes,
one containing the information enabling requirements for accreditation, such as legal and nancial capacity,
technical capability and experience in this eld. The other envelope had to contain an initial bid. The lowest
of the economical bids made by the qualied participants was the starting bid for the auction.
After being accepted as participants, their bid made could not surpass the budget imposed by the
auctioneer, or the starting bid contained in the second envelope opened only one hour previous to the start
of the auction. Moreover, the bid had to be made for the totality of the service. None of the participants
could identify the others and could only see the position of their bid with respect to the others, but not
actual bids (i.e. reserve price).
The auction had a maximum duration of 30 minutes stipulated by the regulations. During this time
any participant could make any number of bids, subject to the new bid being at least 0.5% lower than the
previous bid. A rule stated that if the best bid was made during the last 5 minutes of the auction, an
additional 5 minutes were added. And so on if there was a better bid. If the lowest bid (best bid) seemed
articial to the auctioneer, then he would ask for explanations, if not satised with the explanation, the bid
would be rejected and the next best bid accepted.
5.3.2 Results
For the qualication of the auction there were 2 candidates SELCOMP INGENIERIA LTDA and COMPU-
TEL SYSTEM LTDA. But the second did not pass the technical and experience approval required by the
60For further information visit the website in spanish http://www.procuraduria.gov.co/
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auctioneer. The only participant in the auction was SELCOMP INGENIERIA LTDA. The economic bid
envelope was opened and the bid was COP $1000 million, exactly the budget available. As the bid fullled
the rules, that was the nal price, and SELCOMP INGENIERIA LTDA was the winner61 .
5.3.3 Conclusions
The results show the lack of competitiveness in this type of auction due to high technical and experience
requirements which makes it hard for new entrants to participate or to pass the prequalication process.
The adjudication price was exactly the budget available to provide the service of the help desk, technical
support and full maintenance of physical assets and software systems of its possession in Bogotá and around
the country; the initial economic bid should have been lower than the adjudication price, at least by some
stated percentage, then not all the budget would have had to be spent for the auction to make sense.
However, the auction did not have any incentives for the participants to place a lower initial economic bid,
even if there was more than one participant.
However, the importance in this type of auction, is e¢ ciency and for the winner to satisfy the technical
requirements. In terms of e¢ ciency one cannot tell what the winner of the auction was the one that valued
the price the most. Literature in auction e¢ ciency shows that many issues concerning asymmetric bidders
(when their valuations come from di¤erent distribution functions) could avoid accomplishing e¢ ciency in
this type of auction (Krishna, 2009 ).
Although the goals of the technical requirements and the problem of contract hiring were solved, it would
have been better if this entity had saved some budget by making the auction more revenue optimal, allowing
more entrants the possibility to participate.
Bidders entry is always an important concern (Klemperer, 2002 ). Incentives must be established to
accomplish this goal. For instance, political requirements always promote entry deterrence because legal
issues can be time consuming. One way to avoid this is to reduce or eliminate legal requirements for entry.
Another important concern to attract biddersentry, is the mechanism design, this is the most important one
because literature on this topic has shown that entry deterrence can be a concern when the auction mechanism
chosen promotes predatory behavior. For instance, an auction design where an industrial organization seems
to be oligopolistic, requires a design that enables new participants to promote competitiveness instead of
scaring them out due to the market power. These kinds of loopholes could be either promoted or corrected
by auctions.
61All data was taken from http://www.contratos.gov.co/consultas/detalleProceso.do?numConstancia=09-9-65570.
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5.4 Electronic Auctions in the Colombian Public Sector
5.4.1 General
Electronic multiple unit auctions have been held in the Colombian public sector for some years. This kind
of auction is based on technological platform and internet service named e-procurement, which makes it
possible for acquisitions by the public sector to become more e¢ cient62 .
Electronic auctions have been held because they make the processes more transparent, because informa-
tion is more accessible and there is an increase in the number of bidders. Another important factor is that
savings are made due to the reduction of the transaction and administrative costs for both the auctioneer
and the bidder.
The most common electronic auction held is the reverse auction, which is a descendent auction or
Dutch auction, whereby in a competitive environment the true price of the goods or services is revealed.
In this auction there is a price ceiling and the bidders start bidding until the lowest price is o¤ered. More
details on this can be found in appendix 1.
For these auctions, the public sector entities or auctioneer must establish what they want to acquire, and
which bidders can participate. There is a time set for the extent of the auction, which is between twenty
and forty minutes. There are various options for establishing the price ceiling, for example it can be set
depending on historic price information, whatever price the auctioneer wants, or making a pre-bid by the
bidders and select the lowest price.
Another rule for this type of auction is a distance or percentage stated by the auctioneer between each of
the bids, and also a time distance between bids. Finally the auctioneer decides which information is public
and which will remain private; for example, whether or not to publish which participant bids the best price
and the price, or whether to only publish the position of each bidder.
5.4.2 Results
a) Ecopetrol Electronic Auctions
Ecopetrol held various auctions from 2002 to 2004 for procurement and hiring processes, with the purpose
of achieving transparency, administrative e¢ ciency and principally savings. Annually, Ecopetrol buys and
hires to the value approximately COP $3.5 billion.
Ecopetrol held descending auctions in 2002, 2003 and 2004. In 2002 the hiring budget was COP $3,608
million; the adjudication was for COP $2,944 million, COP $664 millions below the budget, saving 18.4%.
62More informaton in Prada, S. (2005). (In Spanish)
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In 2003 the hiring and procurement budget was COP $14,204 million; the adjudication was for COP $11,004
million, COP $3,200 million below the budget, saving 22.5%. In2004 the hiring and procurement budget
was COP $84,000 million; the adjudication was for COP $63,000 million, COP $21,200 million below the
budget, saving 25%. The total savings approached COP $25,000 million.
The results are best summarized in the table below:
Table 15: Ecopetrol Electronic Auction Results
Auction year Budget (Million COP$) Adjudication (Million COP$) Saving (Million COP$) Saving (%)
2002 3,608 2,944 644 18,4
2003 14,204 11,004 3,200 22,5
2004 84,000 63,000 21,000 25
Total Savings COP $24,864 Million
Source: Prada, S. (2005). Como disminuir el gasto publico utilizando tecnología: Las subastas electrónicas.
Calculation: Prada, S. Departamento nacional de planeación.
In 2003, Ecopetrol also held an ascending auction to sell idle assets and excess of inventory, which had
a reserve price of COP $615 million; the adjudication price was COP $991.9 million, COP $376.9 million
above the reserve price, gaining 61.3%63 .
Ecopetrol Auctions were considered successful due to the increasing yearly savings, and because the time
elapsed for the acquisition was considerably reduced, approximately from seven weeks to 4 days.
b) Seguro Social EPS Electronic Auction
An Entidad promotora de salud (EPS )64 , an entity belonging to the Colombian social security (ISS )65 ,
held an auction in 2003 for the procurement of 406 di¤erent types of drugs, with the purpose of reducing
costs due to the competition of the drug producing entities or transaction costs. The auction held was a
descending auction with a dynamic formation of the supply curve, with the support of an expert company
in charge of e-sourcing / e-business services.
The only available information to the bidders was the price variation determined by the position in
the ranking of the auction. No information about other participants or their bids was disclosed. With
this electronic auction there was no contact between ISS and the drug entities, giving transparency to the
63 Ibid., p.22
64An EPS is a health service company, in charge of providing health insurance to the people. All the funds come from the
government and are manage by these institutions.
65The ISS is a government institution in charge of public health and pension funds. Further information in Spanish can be
found at http://www.iss.gov.co/portal/index.jsp.
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acquisition process as well as reducing the length of the acquisition from approximately 3 or 4 months to 1
or 1.5 months.
The auction led to a range of 20% to 70% reduction of the drug prices. The budget initially stated for
the acquisition was COP $96,249 million but the assigned budget was COP $91,715 million because 25% of
the drugs were not o¤ered. The saving obtained was of 6% plus the saving represented in the IPC index
(Consumers Price Index) and the increase in the purchase volume compared to previous years, resulting in
a total saving of approximately 13%. The EPS of ISS also held an auction in 2004 for the acquisition of
drugs, obtaining a saving of COP $7,300 million66 .
The electronic auction as a drug acquisition mechanism used by the EPS of ISS was successful and very
important for ISS; it represented huge savings in drugs and transaction costs, as well as transparency in
the acquisition process and time reduction. The auction evolved and is perform can be undertaken online
anywhere in the country, giving more element of competitiveness to the drug producing entities and more
e¢ cient prices for the ISS.
5.4.3 Conclusions
These Electronic auctions held either by ECOPETROL S.A and by Seguro Social S.A (ISS ) allowed new
entrants in the market to participate from anywhere in the country, conversely to what theory has stated
about open auctions and collusion and entry deterrence issues. This contributed to the competiveness and
e¢ ciency of the auction as well as budget savings by the entities.
The most signicant issue in these kinds of auctions that are held to hire and acquire goods and services is
money savings and transparency, which are fully accomplished as the results exhibit the big savings made by
ECOPETROL S.A year after year in which the auction was held, as well as the savings made by Seguro Social
S.A. Auctions are anonymous, the only thing that matters is the participantsbids, and the transparency
issue in both auctions was solved.
5.5 Conexión Colombia Auction: Art for a Cause
5.5.1 General
Conexion Colombia Corporation67 and Sokolo¤ & Associates LLC68 ran an auction on September 20th,
2009. The purpose of the auction was to sell 65 paintings using an English ascending auction with initial
66 Ibid., p.24
67The function of this organization is to collect and provide economic funds to a wide variety of foundations in Colombia,
looking for the best impact social projects. Their o¢ cial website in Spanish is http://www.conexioncolombia.com/.
68Sokolo¤ & Associates is an art advisory and public relations group. Their website is http://www.sokolo¤art.com/.
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price for each painting and also a reserve price unknown by the bidders. Each object was sold individually
and each bidder had the opportunity to see the paintings with their commercial price before hand.
The auction began at 8:00pm with 350 bidders. The initial price was set by the hammerthat was the
gure of the auctioneer and each bidder had the opportunity to bid higher values according to the other
competitors in the room. The auction also gave people who wanted to participate and couldnt assist the
opportunity, to bid. This was what the auctioneer called the absent o¤er. The procedure for this o¤er
consisted in leaving an envelope with the maximum bid that the bidder was willing to o¤er for each painting
he liked, and later in the auction the hammerwith all the information of the absent o¤ers, bid, in their
name, knowing the minimum price he could o¤er for winning in the name of the absent person.
However, that was the only exception; all the remaining bidders had to be in the room, or have a person
there to represent them. The auction was a standard auction; each painting was sold to the maximum bid. If
the bid was above the reserve price, every bidder in the room had the opportunity to overbid this maximum
o¤er.
Also, on September 29th 2010, they ran another art auction using the same mechanism and for the same
purpose (charity funds). In this case 89 paintings were auctioned 69 .
5.5.2 Results
In the auction held in 2009, 23 of 65 paintings were sold above their commercial price and all of the paintings
listed in the catalog were sold. The commercial average price was COP $21.939.535 and the average selling
price was COP $19.934.884. Some paintings provided prot (di¤erence between the selling price and the
commercial price), but others didnt. All the nal bids were above the reserve price, although many prices
were below the commercial price70 . A special case is the painting of Carlos Cruz-Diez called Physichromie
No. 2095that gained a prot of nearly COP $40 million. Perhaps this result could be achieved because of
the mechanism chosen by the auctioneer71 . The following table shows the ten most expensive paintings:
Table 16: Art Auction Results
69For paintings catalog, auction details and contact information visit the following website in Spanish,
http://www.conexioncolombia.com/subasta.html/.
70The average prot may be negative in this case, but the only reason for that is that we excluded the Andy Warhol painting
from the data because of inconsistencies.
71Data is not available for the public, it was only provided for this research by Conexion Colombia. Contact information is
available in the link above. For the calculations Warhols painting was not taken into account because the data base provided
seemed inconsistent between the commercial price and the selling price, so we excluded from the averages calculated.
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Lot Number Artist Commercial Price (COP$) Sale Price (COP$)
18 Cruz - Díez Carlos 165,000,000 127,000,000
36 Caballero Luis 55,000,000 41,000,000
27 Zapata Hugo 52,500,000 38,000,000
10 Muniz Vik 48,000,000 62,000,000
32 De szyszlo Fernando 42,000,000 42,000,000
24 Negret Edgar 40,000,000 28,000,000
20 Rojas Carlos 37,500,000 26,000,000
31 Grau Enrique 37,500,000 32,000,000
17 Rojas Miguel Ángel 31,500,000 37,500,000
35 Cárdenas Santiago 30,000,000 47,000,000
Source: Conexion Colombia.
5.5.3 Conclusions
This art auction was undertaken using a mechanism well known in the theoretical eld as an auction design
that allows prices to rise higher than other formats, under assumptions such as private values, symmetric
bidders, increasing bid functions, risk neutrality and no budget constraint (Klemperer, 2002 ). It also provides
incentives for collusion and entry deterrence. In this case, the number of bidders avoids this type of entry
problem and at the same time promotes competition making it almost impossible, due to the number of
competitors, to collude.
However, it is very important to notice that in this type of auction, e¢ ciency is an important factor
and this plays an important role when the auctioneer wants to sell the paintings to the bidder that value it
the most. The results can be a very illuminating symptom of e¢ ciency given the auction mechanism, most
selling prices are similar to the commercial price and also by using theory, bidders will tend to bid all the
way to their value if its necessary. Finally, the auction was a success, according to two criteria. The rst
is that the revenue raised by the auctioneer accomplished their expectations, and the second criteria is that




Cattle Auctions are very common on the Caribbean coast of Colombia, cities like Sincelejo and Monteria,
and towns like Planeta Rica, Sahagún, San Pedro and Sampués are specic places were auctions are held.
COGASUCRE is a cattle marketer in Sincelejo that provides cattle services72 and has held auctions for a long
time (about 15 years). These cattle auctions are held every wednesday. Another, important cattle marketer
in charge of coordinating and regulating cattle auctions in the cities mentioned above is SUBASTAR S.A73 .
Many other small intermediaries work in this region.
In this auction the idea is to sell packages of cattle from every cattle rancher from the region using an
ascending auction (more commonly known as English auction) with a pre-established initial price.
COGASUCRE and SUBASTAR S.A, work as intermediaries between cattle ranchers and possible buyers.
The rst step with this auction mechanism consists in giving a number to each package of cattle o¤ered by
the rancher to weighed by the cattle marketer. Next, each bidder will be in the same place bidding according
to its preferences of the packages. Although, the auction can be thought of as a multiunit auction it is a single
object because each package is sold individually and there are no packages being o¤ered simultaneously.
Another aspect of the auction is that the auctioneer or the owner decides the initial price and each bid
is given for unit of weight, for example a bidder bids X amount of money for 1 kilogram. The total weight
of the package of cattle and the strain is known before bidding.
Throughout the auction, every bidder has the chance to bid an amount of money and they can also
over-bid another competitor, the nal price is determined by the highest bid made. Despite the idea of an
initial price set by the auctioneer, the advantage of this is in the case of COGASUCRE, is that if the package
has no o¤ers after announcing the initial price, then COGASUCRE pays to the cattle rancher the initial
price for each kilogram of the weight of the package, knowing the intermediarys commission.
Also, the quality of the cattle is measured by standard rates of marketer organization and the packages
are classied in two types: rst class cattle and second class cattle. The classication depends on the strain
and condition of the cattle.
The cattle auction is held every wednesday of the month (COGASUCRE) and twice a month (on average)
(SUBASTAR S.A).
72The o¢ cial Spanish website for further information is http://www.cogasucre.com/.
73For further information visit the following website in Spanish, http://www.subastar.com.co/index.htm.
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5.6.2 Results
Many auctions have been held in this region with some interesting results. In 2008, the Colombian journal of
livestock science published an article about cattle auctions in Monteria and Sincelejo74 showing the structure
in these cities. This study will provide the important results presented in that journals article.
Table 17: Cattle Auction
Cattle Statistics
Monteria Sincelejo
Year Buyers Total Cattle Auctions Ran Buyers Total Cattle Auctions Ran
2003 874 123,075 100 411 62,510 47
2004 999 147,796 100 472 82,247 57
2005 778 103,179 100 450 61,669 47
2006 508 80,004 105 578 84,560 62
Source and calculations: Castillo, O. (2008). Market structure of growing
cattle auctions in Monteria and Sincelejo cities (Colombia).
Revista pecuaria de ciencias humanas.
The table above shows a summary of the auctions held over 4 years. In Monteria, the best year for
selling cattle was 2004, it held the same amount of auctions as in 2003 and 2005. In Sincelejo, in 2006 the
biggest quantity of cattle was sold in comparison to 2003, 2004 and 2005. The di¤erence was that 62 auctions
were held in that year and the years before only 47 and 57 auctions were held. Nevertheless, in the case
of Monteria, the auctions held in 2004 attracted the biggest number of bidders in comparison to the other
years. That was also the case in Sincelejo; the auctions held in 2006 had the largest entry of bidders.
The chart below shows some statistical results from cattle auctions in Monteria and Sincelejo. A more
interesting result is presented in the following tables75 .
Table 18: Monteria Index
74More information in Castillo, O. (2008).
75CR4 index: Purchases made by the 4 biggest enterprises or individuals, as a percentage of the overall purchases made by
the industry.
CR5 index: Purchases made by the 8 biggest enterprises or individuals, as a percentage of the overall purchases made by the
industry.
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Cattle auction market concentration index Monteria (% of animals purchased)
Year
Index (%) 2003 2004 2005 2006
CR4 11.8 13.8 13.8 17.3
CR8 18.3 20.4 20.3 24.3
Source and calculations: Castillo, O. (2008). Market structure of growing
cattle auctions in Monteria and Sincelejo cities (Colombia).
Revista pecuaria de ciencias humanas.
Table 19: Sincelejo Index
Cattle auction market concentration index Sincelejo (% of animals purchased)
Year
Index (%) 2003 2004 2005 2006
CR4 21.5 10.7 12.8 12.5
CR8 29.3 18.5 19.4 19
Source and calculations: Castillo, O. (2008). Market structure of growing
cattle auctions in Monteria and Sincelejo cities (Colombia).
Revista pecuaria de ciencias humanas.
These results were compared in 2 indexes called Herndhal (HI) and Rosenbluth (RI)76 , the evolution
of the indexes in those years revealed that auction markets were working similarly to what is known in
economic theory as perfect competition. This can only mean that e¢ ciency relies in the English auction
mechanism (Krishna, 2009 ). Moreover, we can see in the 2 tables above that in Monteria, the biggest market
concentration for the CR4 and CR8 indexes was found in 2006, but in Sincelejo the biggest concentration
was in 2003 for both indexes and since then the market concentration has been decreasing.
Table 20: Market Concentration
Monteria
Year
Index (%) 2003 2004 2005 2006
HI 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.4
RI 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6
76Methodology and index intervals can be consulted in the link mentioned above or whatever standard Industrial Organization
Text-Book.
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Source and calculations: Castillo, O. (2008). Market structure of growing
cattle auctions in Monteria and Sincelejo cities (Colombia).
Revista pecuaria de ciencias humanas.
Table 21: Market Concentration
Sincelejo
Year
Index (%) 2003 2004 2005 2006
HI 2.2 0.9 0.9 0.9
RI 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.5
Source and calculations: Castillo, O. (2008). Market structure of growing
cattle auctions in Monteria and Sincelejo cities (Colombia).
Revista pecuaria de ciencias humanas.
Finally, the market structure indexes shown in the tables above yield that markets were competitive so
collusion does not seem to be an issue.
5.6.3 Conclusions
The English auction used to allocate cattle speaks for itself as well as the results concerning market structure.
The only question that may arise from this design is how the fee that marketers charge for intermediation
between the bidder and the seller a¤ects the initial price: However, in terms of optimality (i.e revenue)
the auction is not a¤ected, because a higher initial price doesnt change the way bidders will bid up to
their valuation and in consequence their expected payment (Krishna, 2009 ). Nevertheless, this bargaining
between the marketer and the cattle seller seems right and protable.
The tradeo¤ between the risk of selling the cattle by themselves (without COGASUCRE or SUBASTAR
S.A) and raising more revenue, and the idea of paying a fee for the intermediary to auction can be seen
as a prime risk that the cattle rancher is willing to pay in order to get a deal. We must remember that if
the auction is bid-less (i.e. no o¤ers are made for the package) COGASUCRE will pay the initial price per
kilogram taking the commission out of the total revenue.
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5.7 Yellow Corn, Soy Beans and White Corn Auction
5.7.1 General
The Ministry of Agriculture77 and the Fenalce78 institution have been running this auction through MAC
regulations79 since 2009 and on average three times a year for each product (yellow and white corn and soy
bean). This is a multiunit auction that works similarly to a uniform auction. Nevertheless, due to all the
MAC regulations some di¤erences can be pointed out.
To begin with the procedure of the auction demands that all the bidders registered in the ministers web
page submit a sealed bid80 taking in account the IBSA81 boundaries published by the agricultural minister.
After collecting all the bids, known only by the respective bidders, taking into account the annual quota
(the estimated imports volume that would be allowed for the agricultural products yellow corn, soy beans
and white corn), each competitor must name a middleman to represent him or her in the Bolsa Nacional
Agropecuaria (BNA)82 where the auction takes place. Next, during the auction a representative agent from
the BNA opens all the bids checking if they fullled the requirements and also waiting to see if any middleman
has any complaints about the bids made by other participants. After that, all the bids, more specically
the IBSA index, are organized in ascending order. This means that the lower the IBSA, the higher the
probability of winning a seasonal quota allocation (the estimated imports volume that would be auction in
each period, set by Fenalce. This quota allows all the bidders who win an amount of importations, for the
products named above, with a special charge), measured in tons. They will be winner bids until the xed
national crop available runs out according to the demands made in the bids. Therefore, priority will be for
the bidders who submit a lower IBSA. Note that this could be achieved if the imports demand is low or if
the national production demands for the product is big enough in the fraction.
The uniform price of the auction can be seen as the intra quota tari¤ (the tax the importer will pay if he
wins the seasonal quota allocation, this intra quota tari¤ will never be higher than the tari¤ notied to the
World Trade Organization ) that all the winners must pay for their imports. This fee is set previously by the
77Agricultural minister is a government institution in charge of all agricultural policy and fair and e¢ -
cient use of land resources in rural areas. For further information visit the following website in Spanish
http://www.minagricultura.gov.co/inicio/default.aspx.
78Fenalce is the Federación Nacional de Cultivadores de Cereales y Leguminosas, a nonprot entity that represents cereal
and legumes growers. For further information in Spanish check the o¢ cial website http://www.fenalce.org/.
79MAC is the Public administration mechanism for the agricultural quota. More information about these regulations can be
found in the following document in Spanish, http://www.fenalce.org/archivos/dec430.doc.
80The bid content is: bidders IBSA, quantity of the national product that he wants to buy and some administrative infor-
mation.
81 IBSA is an auction agricultural index, is the bidding instrument. The denition of the index is the following: IBSA = Qi
Qn
, where Qi is the importation demand and Qn is the national production demand, all this demand is refer to the agricultural
products above.
82BNA is the agricultural domestic exchange, were commodities and agricultural services are trade. Further information can
be consulted in Spanish at http://www.bna.com.co:8080/LABNA/tabid/36/Default.aspx.
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agricultural minister, but the actual bidding competition is made by the incentive of winning a spot in the
seasonal quota allocation, trying to reduce the amount imported and increasing the part being bought to the
country. Note that the price represents the opportunity cost of being left out of the seasonal quota, because
a higher tari¤ must be paid, instead its called the extra quota tari¤ (the tax charged on all agricultural
products that are imported without the season quota allocation).
5.7.2 Results
The following results belong to the seasonal quota allocation of the agricultural commodities yellow corn,
white corn and soy beans. These tables show a summary of some of the auctions held in 201083 .
Table 22: Yellow corn Auction
Yellow Corn Auction 18/05/2010
Importation quota auctioned 626,063 Tons




Seasonla quota allocated in the auction 626,063 Tons
Residual Quota 0
National production allocated 83,475 Tons
Residual of national production 0
Source and calculation: Fenalce.
The yellow corn auction above, held on May 18th 2010, showed a high participation (or bid competition)
clearing the market. An important fact is that the national production allocated, shows how much Colombian
production bidders will have to buy at all in order to gain the right to be exempt of fees.
Table 23: Soy Bean Auction
83All the data was taken from http://www.fenalce.org/pagina.php?p_a=7 (link in Spanish).
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Soy Beans Auction 23/06/2010
Importation quota auctioned 97,500 Tons




Seasonla quota allocated in the auction 60,170 Tons
Residual Quota 37,330 Tons
National production allocated 12,034 Tons
Residual of national production 7,466 Tons
Source and calculation: Fenalce.
The soy beans auction, held on June 6th 2010, didnt perform as well as the yellow corn auction, because
the entire importation quota auctioned wasnt allocated as a result of lack of competitiveness (note that there
was one loser bid with importation quota left, this could be because the bidder didnt have all the requirements
fullled). Also, the national production allocated didnt reach the 100% quota of what Fenalce intended to
allocate.
Table 24: White Corn Auction
White Corn Auction 18/05/2010
Importation quota auctioned 41,500 Tons




Seasonla quota allocated in the auction 41,500 Tons
Residual Quota 0
National production allocated 83,000 Tons
Residual of national production 0
Source and calculation: Fenalce.
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Finally, the white corn auction held on June 8th 2010 had a remarkable performance in comparison to
the soy bean auction. The di¤erence between this auction and the yellow corn auction is that bidders entry
wasnt as it was for the yellow corn auction.
In sum, only the soy bean auction didnt reach the allocation of the entire quota leaving a residual. In
the 3 auctions shown above, we can see that on average, 91.63% of the bids presented were approved, this
leaves little percentage for the losers and this could be because of a high IBSA or a mismatch in the MAC
requirements (could be the case of the soy bean).
Nevertheless, another thing which is important to know are the IBSA boundaries that were considered
in each auction. The following table summarizes that information:
Table 25: IBSA Boundaries
IBSA Boundaries Reference IBSA
Min. Max.
Yellow Corn 5.912 9.088 7.500
Soy Beans 4.411 5.589 5.000
White Corn 0.270 0.730 0.500
5.7.3 Conclusions
One would think, that a xed price set previously to the auction could change all its characteristics. However,
the competitive incentives to avoid paying a importation tari¤ higher than the intra quota tari¤ (oportunity
cost) ensure a standard auction. Therefore, competing behavior is not related to price issues, but to quantity.
In two of the three auctions (shown in the results), the entire seasonal quota was allocated, but in the
soy bean auction all the seasonal quota wasnt allocated. Thus, ine¢ ciency in this particular auction is an
important issue because part of the seasonal quota wasnt allocated and the idea of the prize is to achieve
a lower tari¤ for importation. The Governments objective wasnt accomplished and the reason could be
because of the number of bidders participating, this is why the size of participants is always important for
achieving all the optimality goals and to avoid ine¢ cient results. As in this case, collusion, entry deterrence
and predation are not always the reasons for preferring many bidders, as this case shows there is also a
concern for avoiding ine¢ cient results.
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6 Resume Table
The following table shows a resume of all the auctions that have been mentioned along of this document.
The auctions are presented in the same order as in the paper and substantial information such as the sector,
the industry, auction type, times held, rounds made and units auctioned, is taken in to account.
It is the intention of the paper to provide a guide through the whole text, so the table is a way to provide
some guidance about what to expect from this survey. Readers with particular interests in some industries
or some sectors can check this table to pick a topic of interest, but as we mentioned earlier it is desirable to
read the whole document as a way to learn about auctions in the Colombian environment.
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Auctions Times Held Units Industry Sector Auction Type Rounds
1 Spot Electricity Market Multiple Multiple E&G Public Uniform Single
2 ECOPETROLs Renery One Shot One E&G Both English Multiple
3 Ecogas State-owned Co. One Shot One E&G Public First-price Multiple
4 Three Power Companies One Shot One E&G Public First-price Single
5 Colombia: Energy Obligations One Shot Multiple E&G Public D.C Multiple
6 Available Production of F.Gas One Shot Multiple E&G Both English Multiple
7 P. Communication Services One Shot Multiple CMT Public English Multiple
8 TELECOM-COLTEL One Shot One CMT Public English Multiple
9 Colombia Movil S.A (OLA) One Shot One CMT Both First-price Multiple
10 Third Private TV Channel One Shot One CMT Both First-price Multiple
11 Granahorrar Bank One Shot One Finance Public First-price Single
12 OMA: Repo Multiple Multiple Finance Public Uniform Single
13 Class B TES Bonds Multiple Multiple Finance Public Uniform Single
14 FRECH Multiple Multiple Finance Public Uniform Single
15 Call Option Multiple Multiple Finance Public Uniform Single
16 Put Option Multiple Multiple Finance Public Uniform Single
17 FOGAFIN Bonds Multiple Multiple Finance Public Uniform Single
18 Popular Bank: Hammer Multiple One unit Finance Private Eng./First-Price Single
19 Credit Auction: 2007 case One Shot One unit Finance Public First-price Single
20 Stock Market Multiple Multiple Finance Private Uniform/Volatility Single
21 Education Computers (CPE) Multiple Multiple Other Public Discriminatory Single
Multiple One Other Public Dutch Single
22 Real-Estate Multiple One Other Private English Single
23 Procuraduria General One Shot One Other Public D.S.B Single
24 Electronic Auctions in C.P.S Multiple Multiple Other Both Dutch Single
25 Conexión Colombia: Art Multiple One Other Private English Single
26 Cattle Multiple One Other Public English Single
27 Soy beans, Y&W corn Multiple Multiple Other Public Uniform Single
Note: In the industry column, E&G means electricity and gas and CMT means communications. Also, in the
auction type column, D.C means descending clock and D.S.B means descending sealed bid (in the popular bank
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auction, Eng. refers to English). Finally in the sector column, Both refers to private and public sector.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Appendix 1: Auction description
In this appendix, there is a brief description of the most common auctions, including sealed-bid and open
auctions; as well as auctions in which there is only one object adjudicated (i.e. Single unit auctions) and
more than one object adjudicated (i.e. Multiunit auctions). The auction equivalences described below are
only consistent in a private valuation context, this means that every bidder knows the value of the object
for itself at the moment of bidding. Also, these valuations are identically and independently distributed,
in other words, biddersvalues come from the same distribution and they are not correlated in a statistical
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sense. Meanwhile, with interdependet values the bidders only have partial information on the value of the
object for themselves, as well, other bidders may have information that a¤ects the value that a bidder assigns
to the object. An important implication of interdependent valuations is that the equivalences between open
and closed auctions are broken.
8.1.1 Single Unit Auctions
Some examples of this type of auctions found on this survey can be the "Popular Bank: Hammer auctions",
"Ecogas State-owned Gas Company Auction", "Colombia Movil S.A (OLA) Auction" and "Third Private
TV Channel Auction", among others.
Sealed-bid auctions The most common sealed-bid auctions are the rst price and second price sealed-
bid auctions. This type of auctions are di¤erent from the open auctions not only in the way they are
implemented, but also because in the open format the bidders can acquire more information about the bids
and the strategic behavior of the others, while in the sealed-bid format the bids are in closed envelopes and
the uncertainty about others bidding behavior exists.
First price auction This mechanism is a sealed bid auction, where every bidder submits a bid in
an envelope that is unknown for the rest. The bidder who had the highest bid wins the auction and pays
what he bided. However, Krishna (2009) states that this mechanism is revenue equivalent to the second
price auction under several assumptions. Other characteristics are that rst price auctions are e¢ cient only
in specic symmetric scenarios and avoiding collusion is more likely in this type of formats because of the
uncertainty faced by bidders.
Second price auction This mechanism is a sealed bid auction, where every bidder submits a bid in
an envelope that is unknown for the rest. The bidder who had the highest bid wins the auction and pays the
second highest bid. Revenue equivalence theorem says that this mechanism is revenue equivalent to the First
price auction under several assumptions. Other characteristics are that Second price auctions are always
e¢ cient.
Open auctions The most common open auctions are the English and Dutch auctions.
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English auction This auction is an open ascending price mechanism, where bidders compete between
each other. An auctioneer is directing the auction and is constantly calling prices in an ascending way (be-
ginning with an initial price). The auction takes places as long as there are at least two bidders participating
to acquire the object, and it stops when only one bidder is left, the price that the winner pays is equal to
the price at which the second bidder dropped out. Krishna (2009) states that English auctions are equiv-
alent in a weak form to second price sealed-bid auctions. Also, it is considered that if some conditions are
accomplished, the mechanism has an ex-post e¢ cient equilibrium and some desirable characteristics could
be achieve like optimality (high revenue if there is a high level of competition).
Dutch auction The Dutch auction is an open descending price mechanism. An auctioneer starts
calling a price that is considerably high for anyone to buy it and then it starts lowering the price until nally
one bidder signals that he is interested in the object. Consequently, the object is sold to the bidder at that
price. Krishna (2009) states that Dutch auctions are strategically equivalent in a strong form to rst price
sealed-bid auctions. Therefore, e¢ ciency is not achieved in this mechanism.
8.1.2 Multiunit Auctions
In this type of auctions, more than one object is being sold, these objects may be di¤erent (i.e. complements),
like the "Electronic Auctions in Colombian Public Sector" studied on this survey, but in most cases objects
are identical (i.e. substitutes), like the "Spot Electricity Market Auction" and "Call Option Auction", among
others resumed on this survey. To hold this kind of auctions the auctioneer must prefer to sell each object
individually, than selling it in a whole package in a single unit auction.
Sealed-bid Multiunit auctions The most common sealed-bid multinuit auctions are the Discriminatory,
Uniform and Vickrey auctions.
Discriminatory auction This mechanism is a sealed bid ascending multiunit auction, where every
bidder submits a bid per each of the K units being sold. The bidders who bid the highest K bids win the
respective units. The price that the bidders pay for each of the units is a di¤erent for each of the bidders
and each of the units; each bidder pays its highest bid for the rst unit won, its highest second bid for the
second unit won and consequently for all the units won, for all the bidders. This auction is reduced to a rst
price sealed bid auction when K = 1.
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Vickrey auction This mechanism is a sealed bid ascending multiunit auction, where every bidder
submits a bid per each of the K units being sold. The bidders who bid the highest K bids win the respective
units. The price that the bidders pay for each of the units is a di¤erent for each of the bidders and each
of the units, but the price formation is di¤erent from the discriminatory auction. Each bidder pays the K
highest competing bid for the rst unit won, the K   1 highest competing bid for the second unit won and
consequently for all the units won, for all the bidders, (each bidder has di¤erent competing bids). This auction
is reduced to a second price sealed bid auction when K = 1: With private values this auction allocates the
object e¢ ciently.
Uniform auction This mechanism is a sealed bid ascending multiunit auction, where every bidder
submits a bid per each of the K units being sold. The bidders who bid the highest K bids win the respective
units. The price that the bidders pay for each of the units is a unique price set by the highest losing bid, this
is the Market Clearing price. This auction is reduced to a second price sealed bid auction when K = 1,
but this analogy is not correct in the sense of revenue equivalence.
Open Multiunit auctions The most common open multinuit auctions are the Dutch, English and
Ausubel auctions.
English auction This auction is an open ascending price mechanism, where an auctioneer is directing
the auction begins calling prices in an ascending way (beginning with a preset initial price). The objects are
sold until al least two bidders are left (one bidder can acquire more than one object). When a price is called
each bidder calls out how many object would he buy at that price. The auction ends when all the K objects
are sold (when the total demand is K), the price that the winners pays is equal to the price at which the
demand changes form K + 1 to K. This auction is outcome equivalent in a weak form to the multiunit
Uniform auction.
Dutch Auction The Dutch auction is an open descending price mechanism. An auctioneer starts
calling a price that is considerably high for anyone to buy it and then it starts lowering the price until one
bidder signals that he is interested in one of the K objects at that price. Consequently, the object is sold
to the bidder at that price. The price is then lowered and the process continues until the K objects are
sold. According to Krishna (2009) this auction is outcome equivalent in a weak form to the multiunit
Discriminatory auction.
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Ausubel auction This mechanism is an open ascending price multiunit auction. An auctioneer starts
calling a price and each bidder generates a demand function (for the K identical objects) according to that
price. This procedure is made with each price while they are rising up, an object is sold when the residual
function of a bidder (this is the number of objects minus the global demand without including his own demand
function) is positive in the marginal change between prices. This means that an object is sold when there
is a positive result between the di¤erence of the residual function with the current price, and the residual
function with the price announced before. The price each of the L winners pay (1  L  K) for each object
depending on the price that makes the marginal change in the residual function to become positive. This
auction is outcome equivalentin a weak form to the Vickrey auction.
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